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INTRODUCTION 
The three essays collected here have as one common element that 
Interest in the topics arose out of research revolving around Thorsteln 
Veblen, though no mention Is made of Veblen in any of the papers. 
The first essay represents an effort to establish a simple point. 
Keynes's concept of full employment, and thus involuntary unemployment, 
does not involve any commitment on the matter of labor market clearing. 
Thus, involuntary unemployment could coexist with a labor market which 
cleared. The essay does not contribute much in the sense of positive 
analysis; the mechanism that is used to illustrate something of the 
possibility is not at all new, being a version of the "Thornton effect." 
The intention was to simply eliminate certain preconceptions that may 
unnecessarily constrain thinking on, and approaches to, the Issues 
involved. 
The second essay Is the least satisfactory of the three, in the 
sense that it is the most underdeveloped relative to Its potential. As 
with the other two essays, but more directly and intimately, interest in 
Hilferding arose from work on Veblen. One need not be too involved to 
wonder about a relationship between Veblen's Theory of the Business 
Enterprise and Hilferding's Finance Capital, for at a bare minimum there 
is a superficial resemblance, and perhaps much more. 
The matter of Hilferding is made even more intriguing when combined 
with another loose end in Veblen scholarship, namely J. Laurence 
Laughlln. Veblen's quip that "our peripheries don't even touch" has 
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perhaps been taken too seriously by some, for It Is clearly not the case. 
The Interesting twist on this is some amazing similarities between 
Hilferding and Laughlin, two very dissimilar characters. The immediate 
Impetus for putting the words on paper explains its style, content, and 
brevity. 
The third essay, as it currently stands, represents a more on-going 
or evolving effort; it has not as yet received that stamp of finality 
associated with formal reproduction. 
It is in part motivated by the recognition that the orthodoxy has a 
strong proclivity to lay claim to more knowledge or more generality than 
is perhaps legitimate, through a judicious appropriation of words. One 
recent example of this tendency might be the notion of "regular 
economies" as a route around the now more bumpy road of traditional 
capital theory. One might doubt that the selection of the terra "regular" 
was motivated solely by a desire to represent certain arbitrary 
conditions. This tendency, of course, has a long and honorable tradition 
with terms such as "natural," "real," "normal," etc. Something similar 
seems to be a part of the "rational expectations revolution," for it 
implicitly casts all alternatives to a Gehenna for the irrational, or at 
least a purgatory for the arational. This essay tries to slide Keynes, 
unscathed, through this relatively inhospitable territory, while laying 
claim to much insight and analysis along the way. 
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PART I. RUDOLF HILFERDING: THE DOMINION OF CAPITALISM 
AND THE DOMINION OF GOLD 
4 
Rudolf Hilferding: The dominion of capitalism and the 
dominion of gold 
Bobbie L. Horn and William A. Darity, Jr. 
From the University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK 74104, and University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 
Published in AEA Papers and Proceedings 75(2):363-368, 1985 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November 1918, the USPD-SDP provisional revolutionary government 
established a commission to study the socialization of German industry. 
Its members included Karl Kautsky, Emil Lederer, and, of all people, 
Joseph Schumpeter. Later, when asked how he could have been connected 
with such a commission, Schumpeter reportedly replied that if somebody 
wants to commit suicide, it is a good thing if a doctor is present. 
Weimar Germany had its "doctor," a trained physician, also a member of 
the socialization commission, in Rudolf Hilferding. As the economic 
expert of the SDP and twice Finance Minister in coalition governments, 
Hilferding sought to prescribe treatments as German socialism's 
humanitarian midwife. 
Hilferding's name probably is most familiar to economists for his 
early skirmish with the dreaded Bohm-Bawerk over the equally dreaded 
transformation problem and for the qualified recognition of his treatise 
Finance Capital in Lenin's Imperialism. A number of factors should 
stimulate a renewed interest in this early theoretician of corporate 
capitalism. First, the recent publication of an English translation of 
Finance Capital (1981) means fewer will be limited to accepting 
authoritative summaries without some perusal of its contents. Second, 
there is a continuing and important interest in Marx's theory of money. 
Third, finance and financial crises persist in intriguing economists and 
still await satisfactory treatment. Combined with the receding tides of 
Keynesianism and Monetarism, and the resurgence of "Classicals" of all 
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colors, it may prove interesting to reconsider Hilferding's efforts. 
In this paper, we address three issues. First, we look at 
Hilferding's career and his contributions to Austro-Marxist doctrine. 
Second, we consider his two experiences as Finance Minister: 1) facing 
the crisis of the infamous German hyperinflation; and 2) pursuing 
deflationary policies on the eve of the Great Depression. Last, we offer 
some very brief comments on the relationship between his political 
activities and his Intellectual work as a socialist theoretician. 
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AUSTRO-MARXISM 
Born into what Paul Sweezy described as a "well-to-do Jewish 
mercantile family" (1949, p. xv) in Austria in 1877, Hilferding trained 
in medicine at the University of Vienna, receiving his doctorate in 1901. 
While at the university, he became actively involved in the socialist 
movement and was drawn to the study of political economy. His contact 
with the central figures of the "Austrian school" laid the foundation for 
his Marxist critique of subjectivist approaches in economics. 
Hilferding soon became a leading figure in the Austro-Marxist 
school. In 1904 with Max Adler, he inaugurated the Marx-Studien, the 
theoretical organ of the Austro-Marxists. In 1906, he was lecturing at 
the Workers University at Berlin, along with Rosa Luxemburg. He 
subsequently edited Vorwarts, a major socialist newspaper, and in 1910 
published his major work Finance Capital; A Study of the Latest Phase of 
Capitalist Development. After the war, he edited Freiheit, the journal 
of the Independent German Social Democratic Party (USPD) and upon the 
fragmentation of the USPD moved with other right wing independents to the 
German Social Democratic Party (SDP). He obtained German citizenship in 
1920 and served as Weimar's Minister of Finance briefly in 1923 and 
again, for a somewhat more extended period, in 1928-29. While not 
holding a cabinet post, Hilferding served as a member of the Reichstag 
and edited the SDP's theoretical monthly, Die Gesellschaft. With the 
victory of the National Socialists—a possibility denied by Hilferding 
only a few days before Hitler's appointment to the Chancellorship—he was 
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compelled to flee into exile and forced to redirect his attention from 
the Communist threat to the harder reality of the National Socialists» 
Eventually turned over to the Gestapo by the French authorities in 1941, 
he reportedly hung himself in his jail cell. 
Hilferding is considered the leading economic theoretician of 
Âustro-Marxism, a movement that is of special importance to economists 
because of a common historical and intellectual environment shared with 
the Austrian school of economics. Both Âustro-Marxism and Austrian 
economics reflected similar influences and demonstrated mutual awareness 
of their respective approaches. Hilferding displayed sensitivity to the 
Austrian tradition (along with the German monetary tradition) in the 
pages of Finance Capital and felt obliged to defend Marx from critiques 
launched from such perspectives. Both Hilferding's Austro-Marxist 
economics and that of the Austrian school placed special emphasis on 
distortions in the structure of prices as fundamental to the propagation 
of capitalist crises. Hilferding's Interesting attitude toward the price 
system is apparent In his last publication (1963). However, for the 
Austrlans, the source of these distortions was autonomous to the market 
process, coming particularly from the state. In contrast, for Hilferding 
these distortions had an endogenous origin in the normal workings of a 
capitalist economy, even under thorough-going laissez-faire, though the 
state could be one source. 
Hilferding's Austro-Marxist economics produced two related theories 
of capitalist crises. The primary theory was his conversion of Marx's 
"law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall" into simply a 
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statement about the capitalist business cycle. Hllferdlng, In rejecting 
what he termed "the dogma of the falling Interest rate" (1981, p. 104), 
shifted to a treatment where the rate of profit is something that swings 
periodically rather than secularly downward. Thus, he moved away from 
Marx's conceptual interpretation of the rate of profit in pure form. 
This move from Marx's original approach may have been due to Hllferdlng's 
inclination to view Marx's work as the culmination of classical political 
economy rather than the most substantive critique advanced to that date 
(Henryk Grossman, 1977, p. 48). For better or worse, Hllferdlng's 
Austro-Marxist economics was a variant of Marxism, without immunity to 
Influences from Austrian economics or other "modern" movements—an 
idiosyncratic species of Marxism indeed! 
While Hllferdlng viewed capitalism as historically doomed, he did 
not (as did Marx) attribute its demise directly to the tension between 
the progressive reduction of socially necessary labor time and the fact 
that labor power constituted the sole source of profit. Hllferdlng 
foresaw a transformation of the economy with growing centralization and 
concentration of capital as the normal outcome of competition under 
capitalism. 
Hllferdlng's second major explanation for capitalist crises, in 
addition to cyclical swings in the rate of profit, was the classic Volume 
II problem of dlsproportionality in production. The failure of the 
capitalist pricing mechanism to produce the appropriate signals would 
lead to imbalances in the production of goods across the various sectors 
—especially between wage goods and capital goods. In fact, Hllferdlng 
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even suggested that the cyclical drop in the rate of profit would go hand 
in hand with "the disruption of these proportional relations." (For a 
complete discussion, see pp. 239-66.) 
In exploring the crystallization of crisis, Hilferding identified 
three primary factors in the recurrent fall in the profit rate: 1) the 
extension of turnover time; 2) the rise in the wage rate associated with 
the growth in demand during the upturn of the cycle; and 3) the rise in 
the rate of interest above normal levels adversely affecting 
entrepreneurial profit. However, somewhat strangely, the crisis appeared 
to lack inevitability: "A monetary crisis is not an absolutely necessary 
feature of the crisis, and may not always occur" (p. 274). Banks could 
avert the crisis if they would continue to make credit available to 
producers. But the private banks could not, or would not, make funds 
available for two major reasons, according to Hilferding (p. 260): 
In the first place, speculation in both commodities and securities 
is in full spate and makes increasing demands on the supply of 
credit. Second, . . ., the circulation credit which producers 
extend to each other becomes inadequate to meet the increased 
demands, and here too the banks must help out. 
The banks would do their utmost to keep their retained profits "in liquid 
form, as money"; therefore,the conversion into "productive capital," that 
brings high employment and continued prosperity, does not take place. A 
Hilferding crisis of economic depression, although finding its origins 
outside of the specific characteristics of the financial apparatus, is 
often confirmed by the withdrawal of credit. It is in keeping with 
Hilferding's position, as the economic theoretician of the Austro-Marxist 
school, to construct such a vision of capitalism—unstable, volatile. 
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prone to crises—the antithesis of the vision of Austrian economics, 
sharing many of the same views about the mechanisms of the capitalist 
economic system. 
12 
THE SOCIALIST FINANCE MINISTER 
Hilferding's brief first tenure as Finance Minister began in August 
1923, at the height of the hyperinflation, when Gustav Stresemann was 
called upon to form a coalition government. Hilferding clearly inherited 
a situation which called for immediate and radical action. Hilferding 
had the opportunity to adopt Lenin's dictum (as reported by Keynes, 1963, 
p. 77) and attempt to "destroy the Capitalist System" by debauching the 
currency. But Hilferding did not want to destroy capitalism; he was not 
looking for an economic collapse, but rather "a collapse which will be 
political and social" (1981, p. 366), amounting to a social and political 
transformation of the capitalist economy. For Hilferding, the pressing 
problem was that of domestic inflation. Renegotiation on reparations, 
and almost all else, required monetary stabilization as a precondition. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the nature and extent 
of the gulf between the theory of Finance Capital and Hilferding's 
policies as Finance Minister. One would assume that Part I of Finance 
Capital, "Money and Credit," would be relevant to his political practice, 
particularly in an era of hyperinflation. For some of his critics, it 
was relevant; that was one of Hilferding's problems. 
Part I is probably the most controversial portion of the book. It 
was about this section that Lenin expressed the reservation that Finance 
Capital "gives a valuable theoretical analysis" despite an unspecified 
"mistake the author commits on the theory of money" (p. 11). Even 
Hilferding's theoretical ally Kautsky (see Harold James, 1981, p. 852) 
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voiced disagreement, and Schumpeter dismissed it as "rather old-fashioned 
monetary theory" (1954, p. 881). So too with modern commentators; The 
editor of the new English translation describes it as "[pjerhaps the 
least successful part of the book" (p. 5); reviewer Anthony Brewer (1983, 
p. 102) suggests skipping the section; and David Harvey (1982, pp. 290-
92), following de Brunhoff, situates many of Hllferdlng's errors in his 
misreading of Marx on money. 
One of the primary tasks in Hllferdlng's (1981) treatment of money 
is to offer an explanation of the determination of the value of a pure, 
nonredeemable, state paper money; an explanation of the "modern monetary 
experience" of Holland, Austria, and India. 
Hllferdlng's monetary doctrines do not rest comfortably in any of 
the standard monetary camps. He accepts that "ever since Tooke's 
demonstration, the quantity theory of money has been rightly regarded as 
untenable" (p. 47); however, "there is a reluctance to give due 
recognition to the influence of quantity on the value of money even where 
it really is the determining factor, as in the case of paper money and 
depreciated currency" (p. 50). 
From Hllferdlng's perspective, the theoreticians of the Cuno 
government, the Knapp-Helffereich school, simply went too far in their 
rejection of the quantity theory and were stymied by their value theory 
from devising a theoretically satisfactory explanation. For Hilferdlng, 
"The quantity theory, then, holds good for a currency with suspended 
coinage. After all, the theory was formulated as a generalization of the 
experience with unsettled currencies at the end of the eighteenth century 
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in America, France and England" (p. 55). 
He gives a number of reasons for the impossibility of a pure paper 
currency system. "A pure paper currency is, therefore, impossible as a 
permanent institution, because it would subject circulation to constant 
disturbances" (p. 57). However, he lays out a system in the "abstract" 
in which the quantity of "legal tender state paper money" could not be 
increased, and "[t]he impossibility of increasing the supply of paper 
money would protect it against depreciation" (p. 57), while banks could 
provide an endogenous credit money component to prevent appreciation. 
"Under such circumstances, paper money would behave as gold does 
today. . . ." However, "reality" throws up three obstacles to such a 
scheme (pp. 57-58): 
In the first place, this paper money would be valid only within the 
boundaries of a single state. For settlement of international 
balances, metallic money with an intrinsic value would be required; 
and if this requirement is to be satisfied, the value of the money 
in domestic circulation must be kept on a par with the medium of 
international payments to avoid the disruption of commercial 
relations. 
Second, "there is no possible guarantee that the state will not increase 
the issue of paper money." He ends with a third reason: "money with an 
intrinsic value—such as gold—is always needed as a means of storing 
wealth in a form in which it is always available for use." For 
Hilferding, explanation of Germany's inflation was straightforward. 
Hilferding's analysis would require linking of the mark to gold, 
primarily to constrain the state's financial activities. But also, for 
him capitalism maintains a certain infatuation: 
Credit collapses, and thus suddenly deserted capitalism returns in 
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despair to its first love, to gold. . . . Capitalism thought that 
it had long since liberated itself from the domination of gold, but 
now it experiences a bitter disillusionment, and shaken by panic 
reorganizes its continuing dependence. But such crises are 
cathartic. ... Nevertheless, the more capitalism succeeded in 
establishing its own domination, the less did it allow itself to be 
bound by this golden chain. The loved one, once so demanding, 
learns to be more modest and is eventually satisfied with the role 
of someone in reserve. ... Her demands may become excessive, and 
she may occasionally refuse her favors altogether, but these moods 
do not last long and things soon return to normal. Gold has lost, 
once and for all, its absolute domination. . . (p. 274). 
He saw that even the authority of the state was limited ultimately under 
the laws (and loves) of capitalism. In October of 1923, Keynes was 
writing (1963, pp. 208-09); 
A regulated non-metallic standard has slipped In unnoticed. It 
exists. Whilst the economists dozed, the academic dream of a 
hundred years, doffing its cap and gown, clad in paper rags, has 
crept Into the real world by means of the bad fairies—always so 
much more potent than the good—the wicked Ministers of Finance. 
The Minister Hllferdlng, perhaps not sufficiently wicked, accepted limits 
on the powers of even the bad fairies. 
To most interests, any return to gold appeared strongly deflationary 
in the context of the German situation. But In Hllferdlng's theory, it 
was not necessarily the case. For with a stable money, the banking 
system could create a sufficient quantity of domestic credit money to 
maintain the "social minimum of circulation." But, moreover, in spite of 
any deflationary implications, there appeared no alternative. 
Opponents to the return to gold possessed as one alternative, 
Helffereich's "ryemark/rentenmark" scheme, which appeared to avoid the 
deflationary implications of returning to gold while instilling public 
confidence in a new currency; partly a scheme, partly a bluff (see Erich 
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Eyck, 1963). 
Hilferding's role In the ultimate action is unclear. He served as 
Finance Minister from mid-August to the end of September, and the 
currency reform was Introduced in mid-October after Hilferding had been 
forced to resign. The ultimate plan adopted was a hybrid of the two 
proposals with a Rentenbank being established, issuing notes backed by 
mortgages with the value not tied to rye, but instead to gold. The other 
crucial aspect was a restriction on the Reich in terms of discounting its 
bills with the Reichsbank. 
Hilferding returned to the post of Finance Minister in June of 1928 
in the coalition government of Hermann Muller. This year marked the last 
of the "golden years" with unemployment of 7 percent, just before the 
massive collapse driving unemployment beyond 30 percent by 1932. 
Hilferding remained in office until December 1929 when he resigned in a 
controversy surrounding the negotiations of a state loan with an American 
banking concern. The primary concern of Hilferding in this period was 
the control of the budget and arrangements to "fund," as opposed to 
monetize, that portion that could not be covered by taxes. The deficits 
from the budgets of 1926 and 1927 had created funding problems and the 
unemployment insurance credits were rapidly mounting. Hilferding 
proposed both budget reductions and tax Increases, policies that met with 
wide opposition, all the while resisting "inflationist" schemes. 
So, though not necessarily a "hard-money" man, Hilferding was a 
"sound-money" one. His position seems remarkably close to that of an 
individual who politically could not be more different, an American 
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contemporary, J. Lawrence Laughlln, who also thought of himself as a 
monetary doctor of sorts. Both rejected the quantity theory, except for 
the case of inconvertible state paper money; and, moreover, both rejected 
the viability of such an institution as a permanent arrangement. Both 
accepted some form of the so-called "real bills" doctrine and possessed 
some form of "objective" value theory. Theoretical consistency and 
policy construction often produces peculiar bedfellows. 
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THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Given Hilferdlng's notion of the increasing concentration and 
centralization of finance capital, an idea that ultimately matured into 
his concept of "organized capitalism," he seems to have thought that it 
would be better to simply let the system evolve, according to its own 
inherent logic. Let the system develop organizational forms and 
mechanisms to cope with the surface manifestations of the underlying 
contradictions, and then simply take it over, by democratic means, with 
its essentially "socialistic" organizational structure already in place. 
Analysis of Hilferdlng's theoretical stance is both complemented and 
complicated by the fact that his political activity seems to have offered 
the opportunity to test his theory. It is a widely held view, 
particularly on the left, that, to quote Sweezy: "his record, like that 
of the Social Democratic Party itself, was one of unbroken failure. As 
Finance Minister, he was equally ineffective in dealing with inflation in 
1923 and with impending depression in 1929" (1949, pp. xvli-xvlli). 
Gerd Hardach et al. (1978) echo this view and write that Hllferding 
"made drastic mistakes on virtually every relevant economic question of 
the time: on structural unemployment in the 1920s on the outbreak of the 
world crisis and finally on stabilization policy" (p. 56). These authors 
attribute these "drastic mistakes" to Hilferdlng's "... complete 
reformism. Marxist theory was ... only a rhetorical reference point— 
for concrete analysis social democracy relied on bourgeois economics" (p. 
56). 
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Hllferding seemed to view Marxian political economy as having an 
almost posltlvlstlc scientific autonomy. 
. . . [S]o far as Marxism Is concerned the sole aim of any Inquiry— 
even Into matters of policy—Is the discovery of causal 
relationships. . . . According to the Marxist conception, the 
explanation of how such class decisions are determined Is the task 
of a scientific, that Is to say a causal, analysis of policy. The 
practice of Marxism, as well as Its theory, Is free from value 
judgments (1981, p. 23). 
This view of Marx and this separation of Marxist political economy from 
some Inherent working class perspective can be sensed from Schumpeter's 
evaluation of Hllferding's as Finance Minister (1939, p. 715); 
The minister Hllferding, much too good an economist not to see what 
was wrong and much too good a Marxist not to realize that there are 
situations In which antlcapltallst policy Is In the end antl-
soclallst, actually went so far as to attempt a very "capitalistic" 
fiscal reform. 
20 
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PART II. INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT RECONSIDERED 
22 
Involuntary unemployment reconsidered 
Bobbie L. Horn and William A. Darity, Jr. 
From the University of Texas, Austin, Texas. 
Published in the Southern Economic Journal, January 1983, pp. 717-733. 
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INTRODUCTION 
. . . you go on to say that you must confess that you do not 
understand my doctrine of Involuntary unemployment or full 
employment. But, heavens, my doctrine of full employment Is what 
the whole of my book Is about! Everything else is a side Issue to 
that. If you do not understand my doctrine of full employment. It 
Is perfectly hopeless for you to attempt to explain the book to 
anyone (Keynes, 1973b, p. 24). 
The problems are semantic and conceptual and hence cannot be settled 
by recourse to algebra or geometry until we have a prior consensus 
on the use of terms. . . (Leljonhufvud, 1974, p. 164). 
A recent paper by Reuven Brenner (1979) reveals a continuing 
tendency to discuss Keynes' notion of involuntary unemployment primarily 
as an ethical matter—a matter of social justice.^ Less attention has 
been devoted to the analytical content of the concept, despite the fact 
that the issue was joined at least as early as Viner's (1936) classic 
review of The General Theory. Keynes apparently still was dissatisfied 
with his own development of the concept at that time. Replying to Vlner, 
Keynes (1937, p. 210) acknowledged the need for improvement of the 
"definition and treatment of Involuntary unemployment" in The General 
Theory. 
Despite his dissatisfaction with his own "definition and treatment," 
Keynes seemed to have felt the idea was elementary and fundamental to his 
theory. Once economists had cast off their Classical skins, they could 
intuit the concept with ease. But casting off the old skins was the hard 
task. Nevertheless, once that was accomplished, Keynes tended to embrace 
a wide variety of ways of expressing the notion of involuntary 
unemployment. Many alternative definitions were acceptable to him. 
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Ultimately, the particular definition used became the one most convenient 
for the problem at hand. 
The unifying theme in all the definitions Keynes viewed as 
acceptable was the subversion of the Classical doctrine that the economy 
naturally would tend toward full employment. Keynes' definitions of 
involuntary unemployment were inextricably bound up with his rejection of 
what he viewed as Classical economics. 
It is the object of this essay to provide a reassessment of the 
meaning of Keynes' various definitions of Involuntary unemployment from 
an analytical standpoint. This Inquiry is not intended solely as an 
exercise in doctrinal history. Our major purpose is to detect some 
important implications for the research agenda of modern macroeconomics. 
To the extent that we are concerned with doctrinal issues, it is because 
of our awareness of the symbiotic relationship between definitions and 
analytical constructs. Specifically, we want to see what limits—if 
any—Keynes' definition of full employment sets for the analytical 
structure of The General Theory. 
Our central argument is that Keynes' notion of Involuntary 
unemployment was sufficiently general to be independent of whether or not 
one treats the aggregate labor market or all aggregate markets as 
2 
clearing. An appropriate extension of Keynes' "definition and 
treatment" yields sensible meaning to involuntary unemployment even when 
demand and supply for labor as a whole are equal. Less-than-full 
employment in Keynes' terms is a condition divorced from whether or not 
all macro-markets clear. 
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At the outset, we note that there are at least two ways to conceive 
of macro-equilibrium. Paul Davidson (1967) has labelled these two 
notions Marshallian and Walrasian. The Marshallian conception denotes a 
resting point—a stationary position of the economy from which no further 
change occurs. The Walrasian conception of equilibrium requires all 
3 
markets to clear. 
Stationarity is the crucial feature of the Marshallian equilibrium. 
It is irrelevant whether or not supplies and demands in all markets are 
in balance. Even if one or more markets fail to clear, there may be no 
"inherent" forces sufficient to bring about a movement away from such a 
position. In the Walrasian case, demands and supplies must be equal 
everywhere. 
It is widely believed that Keynes' unemployment equilibrium is 
incompatible with a Walrasian equilibrium. We argue that Keynes' less-
than-full-employment equilibrium can be consistent with complete market 
clearing. Keynes was a Marshallian in method and the Marshallian 
conception of equilibrium is more general than the Walrasian, for it can 
include resting points with or without universal market clearing. 
Correspondingly, so can Keynes' General Theory. Therefore, the existence 
of unemployment equilibrium on Marshallian terms does not preclude the 
existence of unemployment equilibrium on Walrasian terms. As we will 
argue below, it, of course, depends under which of Keynes' various models 
(and assumptions) the matter is posed. 
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SEVERAL DEFINITIONS OF INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT 
To begin our case, we start with the first definition Keynes offered 
of full employment in The General Theory. Initially, Keynes (1936, p. 
15) treated full employment as the absence of Involuntary unemployment 
4 for which he gave the following seemingly tedious definition: 
Men are involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise In 
the price of wage-goods relatively to the money wage, both the 
aggregate supply of labour willing to work for the current money-
wage and the aggregate demand for it at that wage would be greater 
than the existing volume of employment. 
Immediately after the passage above, Keynes (1936, p. 15) says, "An 
alternative definition, which amounts, however, to the same thing, will 
be given in the next chapter (p. 26 below)." 
In Chapter three of The General Theory, Keynes (1936, p. 26) can be 
found observing: 
In the previous chapter we have given a definition of full 
employment In terms of the behaviour of labour. An alternative, 
though equivalent, criterion is a situation in which aggregate 
employment Is inelastic in response to an increase in the effective 
demand for its output. 
Although Keynes treats these two definitions as "the same thing," 
they are not necessarily. Moreover, neither definition means, 
unequivocally, that a condition of excess supply for labor exists. 
By Keynes' chapter two definition of "Involuntary unemployment," 
less than full employment would exist if the real wage from labor's 
perspective could be lowered while employment Increases. Indeed, this 
first definition is consistent with a situation where the supply exceeds 
the demand for labor as a whole if (1) the demand schedule for labor Is a 
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decreasing function of the real wage, (2) the supply schedule for labor 
is an increasing function of the real wage, (3) both the demand and 
supply for labor are functions only of the real wage rate, and (4) there 
Is only one sector. If assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4) apply, there 
is only one possible level of employment consistent with labor market 
clearing. Then, by Keynes' first definition. Involuntary unemployment 
only could exist when there was excess supply in the labor market. 
These four assumptions would provide the labor market story for the 
most stringent of Keynes' models—the assumptions that would give the 
Classlcals consistency in their perspective. Under these assumptions, an 
unemployment equilibrium is virtually a contradiction in terms. 
Unemployment equilibrium could not be consistent with labor market or 
complete market clearing. 
But Keynes plainly rejected the third and fourth assumptions.^ The 
thrust of Keynes' (1936, pp. 272-9) Appendix to Chapter 19, where he 
launched a detailed attack on Plgou's Theory of Unemployment, was the 
complaint that Plgou was mistaken In his view that only one level of 
employment could be consistent with labor market clearing. 
As Keynes pointed out, Plgou began his analysis with a two-sector 
world ("wage-goods" and "capital-goods"), but somehow managed to cross 
over into a one-sector model that obscured compositional changes in 
output as a whole. The two-sector character of Keynes' own model Insured 
that the market for labor could clear at many different levels of 
employment, a possibility of which he was well aware. Keynes (1936, p. 
275) argued explicitly that the demand for labor in the nonwage goods 
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sector would depend not only on the relative price of labor but also on 
the Interest rate and business expectations. 
It Is, indeed, strange that Professor Pigou should have supposed 
that he could furnish a theory of unemployment which Involves no 
reference at all to changes in the rate of investment (i.e., to 
changes in employment in the non-wage-good industries) due, not to a 
change in the supply function of labour, but to changes^in (e.g.) 
either the rate of interest or the state of confidence. 
Keynes further pointed toward the possibility of the existence of 
several levels of employment consistent with labor-market clearing when 
he observed that Pigou's own analysis suggested that Pigou omitted a 
shift variable in the labor supply function. This conclusion was drawn 
from Pigou's admission of one of Keynes' (1936, p. 275) central points— 
that labor typically can bargain directly only over the money wage rather 
than the real wage; 
Moreover, he [Pigou] stipulates that within certain limits labor in 
fact, often stipulates, not for a given real wage, but for a given 
money-wage. But in this case the supply function of labour is not a 
function of . . . [the general real wage rate] alone but also of the 
money-price of wage-goods: —with the result that the previous 
analysis breaks down and an additional factor has to be Introduced, 
without there being an additional equation for this additional 
unknown. 
Keynes' Appendix to Chapter 19 reveals that he envisioned aggregate 
labor demand and supply schedules that varied with movements in variable 
other than the real wage rate measured in terms of the general price 
level.^ Keynes' labor market could clear at many levels of employment. 
As a result, his first definition of involuntary unemployment can be 
reconciled with a condition of equality between labor demand and supply. 
Less-than-full employment or Involuntary unemployment would exist if 
more employment could be attained by lowering real wages from labor's 
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perspective. The reduction in real wages would be accomplished by 
raising the price of wage-goods via a stimulus to aggregate demand. 
Keynes' first criterion for identifying full employment was that level of 
employment at which a further increase in the price of wage goods and the 
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concomitant fall in real wages will not push employment higher. 
To clarify how Keynes' concept of full employment can depart from 
modern orthodoxy, consider a reduced form equation for employment from a 
macromodel of simultaneous equations (see Appendix). In deriving the 
reduced form equation, all markets can be assumed to clear. An initial 
Walrasian equilibrium will be associated with a given set of values of 
the macro-stabilization variables; i.e., a given level of government 
expenditure-cum-deficit and a given rate of growth of the money supply. 
If an increase in government spending or a stepped up monetary expansion 
lowers the real wage in terms of wage-goods but employment Increases, 
then the initial level of employment was characterized by involuntary 
unemployment. If the macro-policy change can move the economy to a 
higher level of employment at a lower real wage, then by Keynes' chapter 
two definition the economy has moved closer to full employment. This 
prospect can arise under complete market clearing with the multivariate 
labor demand and supply schedules Keynes depicted that shift 
simultaneously with every movement in aggregate demand and supply. 
To reinforce this point, Keynes consistently did not identify a 
surplus of labor in terms of excess supply in the labor market. Instead, 
he (1936, p. 289) Identified the surplus in terms of whether or not more 
employment would be forthcoming at constant or falling real wages: 
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XThere Is underemployment of laborU until a point comes at which 
there is no surplus of labour available at the then existing real 
wage; i.e., no more men (or hours of labour) available unless money-
wages rise (from this point onwards) faster than prices. 
Keynes (1936 pp. 10-13) emphasized that labor contracts were 
typically set in nominal terms, which precluded direct bargains over the 
real wage, especially in a climate of unmeasurable, subjective 
9 
uncertainty. Labor collectively might have been willing to take a 
larger real wage bill, at a lower real wage, due to a sufficient Increase 
in total employment. But there was no way to insure this through wage 
contracts made in nominal terms. In addition, even if laborers were 
willing to accept lower real wages in terms of wage-goods, that would not 
guarantee the employers in the non-wage-goods sector a lower real wage. 
It would depend upon what was happening to the prices of new capital 
goods in Keynes' system. 
If the prices of wage-goods go up while money wages remain 
unchanged, real wages fall from the perspectives of both workers and 
employers in the wage-goods sector. But for employers in the non-wage 
goods sector, the level of real wages depends not on the prices of wage-
goods, but the prices of their own products. If laborers accept a 
nominal wage bargain which lowers their real purchasing power in terms of 
wage-goods, they may not be simultaneously offering non-wage goods 
employers a lower real cost of hiring them. Capital goods prices might 
be falling more sharply than money wages. 
Based upon his chapter two definition, one could generalize Keynes' 
approach to the collective "involuntarlness" of unemployment to argue 
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that labor Is unable to set the entire vector of relative prices, 
including real wages from all employers' perspective, that will raise 
total employment. 
Moreover, Keynes' second definition need not be viewed as equivalent 
to the first. In chapter three's definition, Keynes made no mention of 
changes in the ratio of money wages to the price of wage-goods. His 
chapter three definition has it that full employment is reached when the 
elasticity of employment with respect to an increase in the effective 
demand reaches zero.11 makes no explicit reference to what happens to 
the real wage rate. Taking the second definition in isolation means if 
an aggregate demand expansion leads to higher employment, with or without 
higher real wages measured in terms of wage-goods, the previous condition 
12 is less than full employment. 
In Chapter 20 of The General Theory entitled "The Employment 
Function," Keynes (1936, pp. 280-91) worked explicitly with Cambridge-
styled elasticities to redevelop his argument in algebraic terras. Once 
more the notion of full employment is linked to a condition where the 
elasticity of employment with respect to effective demand finally reaches 
zero.13 
Keynes also Introduced his original concept of a neutral rate of 
Interest, providing a discussion that makes it even clearer that a 
reduced form equation for employment is relevant for identifying his full 
employment threshold. The neutral rate of Interest represented Keynes' 
final coming to terms with Wicksell's natural rate of interest. For 
Keynes, Wicksell's natural rate was the rate of Interest prevailing at 
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any equilibrium level of employment, but the neutral rate was the rate of 
interest prevailing at Keynes' (1936, p. 243, emphasis in original) full 
employment : 
I am now no longer of the opinion that the concept of a 
"natural" rate of interest, which previously seemed to me a most 
promising Idea, has anything very useful or significant to 
contribute to our analysis. It is merely that rate of interest 
which will preserve the status quo, and, in general, we have no 
predominant Interest in the status quo as such. 
If there is any such rate of Interest, which is unique and 
significant, it must be the rate which we might term the neutral 
rate of Interest, namely the natural rate in the above sense which 
is consistent with full employment given the other parameters of the 
system; though this rate might be better described, perhaps as the 
optimum rate. 
The neutral rate of interest can be more strictly defined as 
the rate of Interest which prevails in equilibrium when output and 
employment are such that the elasticity of employment as a whole is 
zero. 
We personally make no claims about the "social optimality" of this 
particular level of employment. We only wish to make clear that it is 
the level Keynes referred to as full employment. 
The final place in the General Theory where Keynes provided an 
explicit discussion of his notion of full employment is in Chapter 21 
entitled "The Theory of Prices." Here, less-than-full employment is a 
condition where the economy has not yet crossed the threshold to what 
Keynes called "true inflation." As long as an expansion in effective 
demand could continue to raise output or employment, Keynes' Involuntary 
unemployment would exist. 
Chapter 21 proves that Keynes did not believe that prices would stay 
constant at less-than-full employment. Quite the contrary, up to the 
point of "true inflation," both prices and output could rise In tandem. 
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As long as both employment and prices could rise together, Keynes (1936, 
p. 303) said "the effect of monetary expansion is entirely a question of 
degree, and there is no previous point at which we can draw a definite 
line and declare that conditions of inflation have set in." Thus, full 
employment is reached when the consequence of additional monetary growth 
14 is neutral in the sense of having no effect on output and employment. 
When a monetary expansion becomes neutral, the result is "true 
inflation." Under conditions of true inflation, monetary growth leads to 
a proportionate increase in all prices, leaving undisturbed relative 
prices. Only at Keynes' full employment position did he claim that the 
simplest version of the quantity theory of money would become operative. 
Neutrality of money as Keynes' condition for full employment is 
entirely compatible with his prior definition of full employment as a 
condition where the elasticity of employment with respect to effective 
demand is zero. Thus, full employment in The General Theory is the 
maximum level of employment attainable by expanding aggregate demand.^^ 
This conception is independent of whether or not the labor market or all 
markets clear in equilibrium.^^ We might interpret the case of a 
movement from one level of employment with general market clearing to a 
higher level of employment with general market clearing as a 
representation of Keynes' notion of "shifting equilibrium."^^ 
When the labor market clears, no workers have an incentive to alter 
wage contracts at prevailing prices and the prevailing level of effective 
demand. No new bids for labor services will be forthcoming. But the 
collective position of labor need not reflect the highest level of 
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employment attainable in the absence of direct government control over 
the wage bargaining process. With "free" labor market contracting, a 
higher level of employment could be reached with an increase in aggregate 
demand. The mere fact that the labor market clears or all markets clear 
need not mean money has become neutral. 
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SOME IMPLICATIONS 
We believe our interpretation of Keynes' conception of full 
employment can bear some rich fruit for various problems and issues that 
have been raised in modern macroeconomics. These include the following: 
1. By the conventional definition of full employment; i.e., labor 
market clearing, if there are many levels of employment where the supply 
and demand for labor equalize, all of them must be positions of "full 
18 
employment." Keynes' conception of full employment, in contrast, 
provides a selection criterion among all the labor market-clearing levels 
of employment. 
2. Keynes' definition of involuntary unemployment permits an 
"unemployment equilibrium" to hold on either Marshallian or Walrasian 
terms. There is no need to go down the tortured road of persistent 
macro-"dlsequilibriura" analysis. Say's Law or Walras' Law can hold, but 
they are quite unimportant since they can hold at many different levels 
of output and employment. Keynes' economics need not be the economics of 
"non-Walrasian" equilibria. 
3. The customary treatment of involuntary unemployment and 
unemployment equilibrium frequently is based upon rigidity of the money 
20 
wage rate. None of this is necessary for the interpretation of Keynes' 
views once it is recognized that labor market "disequilibrium" is not 
what is at stake. 
In Chapter 19 of The General Theory, Keynes (1936, pp. 157-71) 
described in detail the destabilizing consequences of variations in the 
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money wage rate. Keynes plainly thought that complete money wage 
flexibility would not prevent an unemployment equilibrium from 
developing. Falling goods prices would chase downward falling money 
wages leaving employment as depressed as ever. 
In Keynes' model, money wage reductions would lower aggregate demand 
price since consumption expenditures came primarily out of the wage bill. 
This decline in aggregate demand price could more than offset the 
incentive effect for producers created by a lower aggregate supply price 
due to the wage decline. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 21 Keynes (1936, p. 296) recognized the 
possibility that the money wage could rise at less-than-full employment. 
Keynes mentioned five complications that qualified the view that at less-
than-full employment, output and employment would change in the same 
proportion as the quantity of money. One of the five complications was a 
rise in the wage-unit before the elasticity of employment with respect to 
2 1  
effective demand reaches zero. 
4. Given Keynes' conception of full employment, unemployment 
equilibrium is possible in the absence of price inflexibilities or market 
Imperfections. This means that Keynes' fundamental explanation of 
stagnant economic activity—an anticipated and ongoing collapse of 
private investment expenditure—can be restored to center stage. Under 
laissez faire, there was no reason for investment spending, and hence 
effective demand, to be maintained at a level to sustain Keynes' full 
employment. 
5. Search theoretic explanations of unemployment remain Irrelevant 
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from the vantage point of Keynes' system. Keynes (1936, pp. 6-15) also 
quite vigorously stated that The General Theory was not concerned with 
unemployment associated with search behavior or refusal to work. For the 
implicit assumption of those who now claim all current unemployment is 
voluntary in character is that the labor market tends to clear. But 
Keynes' conception of involuntary unemployment is compatible with the 
labor market clearing at a level of employment before the onset of "true 
inflation." The current unemployment can still be understood as a 
consequence of inadequate effective demand due to relatively low private 
investment. 
6. There is no intrinsic paradox to an observed procycllcal 
movement of real wages if the analysis is one where depression levels of 
employment are interpreted as a condition where the labor market clears 
at too low a level of employment. The paradox only arises from 
conceptualizing depression level employment as being associated with 
excess supply in the labor market. Then, economic expansion and rising 
employment theoretically are linked to falling real wages. If, however, 
the labor market clears at too low a level of employment, it could move 
toward clearing at a higher level—after a rise in effective demand—with 
higher real wages. 
7. Neither labor market clearing nor general market clearing is a 
sufficient condition for full employment in Keynes' sense. Keynes as a 
proper Marshalllan probably did not tend to think in terms of market 
clearing or nonmarket clearing anyway. But to the extent that even 
contemporary Marshallians can slip into Walrasian language, it is useful 
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to demonstrate that Keynes' unemployment equilibrium could be a Walrasian 
equilibrium.23 
To conclude, the inadequacies of previous interpretations of Keynes' 
General Theory described here are traceable, at least in part, to a 
failure to confront Keynes' concept of full employment. This has led, in 
turn, to a parallel failure to grasp the very literal meaning Keynes 
attached to the concept of less-than-full employment equilibrium. On 
Keynes' own definitions and assumptions, an "unemployment equilibrium" 
takes on a generality and logical validity that cannot be grasped under 
the interpretations of Keynes' economics that have currency. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. A similar tendency is evident in Elizabeth and Harry Johnson's 
(1978) description of Keynes' development of the concept of involuntary 
unemployment as a reflection of an aristocratic Victorian's vision of the 
requirements for a happy society. One of the few recent assessments to 
go beyond limiting the significance of the concept of voluntary 
unemployment to Keynes' moral compass has been Richard Kahn's (1976) 
contribution to a conference in Durham, England in March 1974. However, 
Kahn (1976, pp. 23-24) says that at the time of the writing of the 
General Theory, the depression was so prolonged and severe in Britain 
that he placed little importance in making precise distinctions between 
voluntary and Involuntary unemployment; therefore, he did not contribute 
to "the wording of Chapter 2 of the General Theory" where Keynes offered 
his first definition of Involuntary unemployment. 
2. It is so customary to treat Keynes' notion of Involuntary 
unemployment as requiring the aggregate labor market to be In excess 
supply that it hardly needs documentation. However, we offer some 
examples to highlight the point. In one of the earliest assessments of 
The General Theory, Charles Hardy (1936, p. 492) concluded that one of 
Keynes' major theoretical claims was "The price system cannot clear the 
market for labor." In his highly influential development of the IS-LM 
framework a decade later, Franco Modigliani (1944, pp. 76-77) laid the 
general cause of Keynes' unemployment equilibrium at the doorstep of wage 
rigidities that left the market for labor with a greater supply than 
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demand. Finally, In a rare recent attempt actually to discuss Keynes' 
definitions of involuntary unemployment, James Tobin (1972) remained 
committed to the view that Keynes' unemployment requires "persistent 
disequilibrium" in the labor market. 
An additional weakness of Brenner's (1979) discussion Is that it 
remains entangled with ihe contemporary view that Involuntary 
unemployment must mean a failure of the aggregate labor market to clear. 
We do not claim that these interpretations are Invalid; we do claim 
that they are too restrictive. Keynes' involuntary unemployment is 
meaningful when the labor market clears. 
3. Victoria Chick (1978, p. 17) has made a similar distinction: 
"There are two concepts of equilibrium extant in economics: 1. 
Equilibrium is a point of rest; forces leading to change are either 
absent or countervailing. 2. Equilibrium is a point at which supply 
equals demand." Oddly, Chick attributes an earlier recognition of the 
distinction to Robert Clower (1960) in a paper where he examined 
Keynesian and Classical views of the labor market. Chick (1978, p. 17) 
says Clower distinguished between an "equilibrium" and "market clearing." 
On close Inspection of Glower's essay, we could not find such a 
distinction. 
4. Kahn (1976, p. 21) has wondered "why It was necessary to be so 
complicated." Hopefully, this essay will help demonstrate why. 
5. Leijonhufvud (1968) has argued that Keynes' model has two 
productive sectors. However, Froyen (1959) has made a persuasive case, 
based in large part upon Keynes' correspondence and drafts of The 
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General Theory that preceded publication, that Keynes' model consisted of 
a single productive sector. The one-commodity was on this Interpretation 
put to two separate uses—both as a flow of consumer goods and new 
capital goods. The difficulty with this interpretation is Keynes' 
explicit tendency to distinguish between the prices of wage-goods and 
non-wage-goods. This led him, in turn, to recognize that the real wage 
In the eyes of entrepreneurs in each sector would be different. 
Note also that if Keynes had rejected either the first or second 
assumptions—if he had assumed increasing returns to the employment of 
labor on a backward bending labor supply curve In terms of the real 
wage—by Keynes' first definition, involuntary unemployment could exist 
if the labor market was clearing. 
6. Plgou was further excoriated by Keynes (1936, p. 275) for 
falling to analyze what factors determine the proportions of employment 
across the two sectors by collapsing incorrectly the two demand schedules 
for labor into a demand curve for labor as a whole, ". . . [Pigou's] 
omission to discuss what determines the connection between . . . 
employment in the wage-goods and non-wage-goods industries, respectively, 
still remains fatal." 
7. In the early pages of The General Theory (1936, pp. 6-11), 
Keynes challenged what he viewed as the Classical labor supply function 
with his rejection of what he termed the "Second Classical postulate," 
the notion that the real wage is equal to the marginal disutility of 
labor. Keynes' (1936, p. 8) repudiation of the "Second Classical 
postulate" led him to argue that the supply of labor depends upon more 
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variables than the real wage. Keynes (1936, p. 8, n. 1) referred the 
reader to the Appendix for Chapter 19. 
8. Keynes (1936, pp. 8-15) viewed laborers as unwilling to accept a 
reduction in the real wage brought about by cuts In money wages but 
willing to accept a reduction brought about by an inflation in the price 
of wage-goods. Keynes argued that since a reduction in real wages 
brought about by cutting money wages would be a piecemeal process— 
conducted employer by employer—It would affect adversely the relative 
wage position of those laborers who were first to accept a drop in their 
nominal wage rate. In contrast, an inflation of wage-goods prices would 
affect all laborers' real wage simultaneously and in the same proportion, 
leaving everybody's relative wage position unchanged. By Keynes' line of 
reasoning, a fall in the real wage accomplished by money wage cuts would 
be acceptable to labor if an equiproportlonate, simultaneous fall in all 
money wage rates could be mandated by a central authority. This would, 
however, constitute a direct intrusion by the state in setting of wage 
contracts. (Also, see Tobin, 1972.) 
S. C. Tsiang (1980, p. 468, n. 2) has claimed that Keynes simply was 
wrong—that labor tends to resist reduction in the real wages 
accomplished by any course; 
Another "revolutionary" feature of the Keynes theory is in the 
theory of employment, where the classical assumption that the supply 
of labor is a function of the real wage rate is replaced by a new 
assumption that workers would be content with a fixed money wage 
rate until full employment is reached. This has proved false also. 
Trade unions nowadays not only are deeply concerned with the real 
wage rate but would even seek to raise It periodically regardless of 
the increase in productivity. 
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However, after a prolonged exposure to conditions of less than full 
employment labor's desire to resist real wage cuts may be just as strong 
but labor's capacity to resist such cuts may be softened considerably. 
Household savings will be depleted. In England of the 1920s and early 
1930s, social Insurance programs for the unemployed were still in their 
infancy. Short of a revolution, ultimately workers will accept a lower 
real wage out of the necessity of obtaining work to support themselves 
and their families. Keynes simply concluded that it would be politically 
easier to lower the real wage by inflation rather than by piecemeal 
downward revisions in wage contracts. 
Regardless, in the appendix where we sketch a model to demonstrate 
the argument of this essay, we eschew the assumption that the supply of 
labor is infinitely elastic at a fixed money wage rate In favor of far 
more conventional labor supply functions. 
9. Given the central emphasis Keynes placed on subjective 
uncertainty, both his demand and supply schedules for labor must be 
treated as dependent on the state of expectations. Mishan (1964), while 
still trapped within the customary view of full employment, argued that 
the demand for labor in Keynes' model should be viewed as a demand 
derived from the effective demand for output as a whole. In an earlier 
paper, Edgar Edwards (1959) treated the demand for labor as derived from 
Keynes' aggregate demand and supply price schedules (see Appendix). 
Edwards also grasped the importance of the interdependency between the 
demand and supply functions for output as a whole and their immersion in 
uncertainty in Keynes' analysis. 
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10. It means, further, that on this view one would not make a hard 
and fast distinction between the official or measured unemployed and non-
labor force participants. Keynes' involuntarily unemployed also could 
include Joan Robinson's (1936) disguised unemployed who have been 
discharged, by a decline in effective demand, from "the general run of 
industries." Keynes (1973b, p. 364) himself included the following 
passage in the first and second proofs of The General Theory: "This does 
not imply that labor, which is suffering involuntary unemployment, is 
idle. It may be employed as a pis aller in some occupation where it 
earns a real wage less than the wage potentially available. And, of 
course, a man who is not 'out of work' might prefer to be working for a 
longer work week even at a lower hourly real wage than he is actually 
earning." 
11. There are several other places where Keynes offered definitions 
of less-than-full-employment similar to the one in chapter two of The 
General Theory. In correspondence with R. F. Kahn in September 1931, 
Keynes (1973a, p. 373) commented that, "When resources are fully 
employed, the supply schedule for goods as a whole is inelastic." 
Writing to Beveridge on July 28, 1936, Keynes (1973b, p. 58) observed, 
"The only reason why the orthodox theory denies the multiplier is because 
it is in fact assuming that there is always full employment, so that 
output as a whole has a zero elasticity." 
In his 1937 contribution to the Irving Fisher festschrift (1946, p. 
423), Keynes said, "Indeed the condition in which the elasticity for 
output as a whole in zero, is, I now think, the most convenient criterion 
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for defining full employment." In none of these cases is market clearing 
nor the labor market, in particular, at the center of Keynes' attention. 
12. In Keynes' view, the chapter two and chapter three definitions 
were equivalent because he did not believe that employment and real wages 
could increase at the same time. At the time he wrote The General 
Theory, Keynes was convinced that employment as a whole was Inversely 
related to real wages. But under some parameterlzations, given a reduced 
form equation for employment (see Appendix), an Increase In aggregate 
demand might push money wages up faster than prices and employment still 
could rise. This is consistent with the observed procyclical movement of 
real wages. Jean de Largentaye (1979, pp. 7-10) has explained that 
Keynes was misled, by statistical evidence that purported to demonstrate 
an Inverse relationship between real wages and employment, into thinking 
labor's real wage must fall for employment to rise. 
But Tobin (1972, p. 3) acknowledged In his AEA Presidential address 
that the possibility of simultaneously raising real wages and employment 
actually gives added support to the usefulness of Keynes' criterion for 
less than full employment: 
When employment could be reduced by expansion of aggregate demand, 
Keynes regarded it as involuntary. He expected expansion to raise 
prices and lower wages, but this expectation is not crucial to his 
argument. Indeed, if it is possible to raise employment without 
reduction In the real wage, his case for calling the employment 
Involuntary is strengthened. 
Tobin's observation suggests that Keynes' full employment is the 
maximum level of employment attainable by expanding aggregate demand. 
What could be a more natural concept of full employment for Keynes, since 
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the core of The General Theory Is a rehabilitation of the principle of 
effective demand? 
Moreover, Keynes' (1936) Chapter 19 model, his complete or most 
general model, with which he explored the consequences of a change in the 
money wage rate, suggests some ambivalence which was confirmed fully in 
Keynes' (1939) later essay evaluating the Dunlop and Tarshis studies 
which finally overturned the prior empirical basis for the claim that 
real wages move countercyclically. Keynes' ultimate position seemed to 
be anything could happen to the real wage depending upon prevailing 
elasticities. 
13. Hicks (1937, p. 158) only confused matters by suggesting that 
"full employment can be defined as a condition where "any rise in income 
calls forth a rise in money wage rates. ..." A rise in money wage 
rates need not preclude a rise in output and employment in Keynes' most 
general model. 
14. The issue of what Keynes conceived of as "money" is a difficult 
one in its own right. Chapter 17 of The General Theory is the textual 
location where Keynes offers a definition of money based upon its 
"essential properties." We prefer his analytical definition of money— 
whatever has a liquidity premium exceeding its carrying cost. But this 
is not an issue we intend to pursue in this essay. 
15. Consider also the alternative definition of unemployment Keynes 
(1973b, p. 26, emphasis In original) offered during a lengthy 
correspondence with Hawtry in early 1936: "'There Is less than full 
employment if the propensity to consume being assumed unchanged, an 
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Increase In investment will cause an increase in consumption. As against 
this the normal assumption of the classical theory is that an increase in 
investment will involve a decrease in consumption." Less than full 
employment exists in the absence of crowding out no matter what happens 
to the price level or in the labor market. 
16. Only in chapters 2 and 19 does Keynes discuss the labor market 
at all in The General Theory. Chapter two lays the basis for the 
critique of the Classicals and chapter 19 displays his full model in 
operation (see n. 12 above). It is difficult to trace precisely how many 
assumptions about the nature of the labor market are broken in the 
transition from chapter two to 19. 
17. This broadens the range of interpretation of Keynes' "shifting 
equilibrium" even beyond the limits set by Jan Kregel (1976) in his 
valuable essay on Keynes' methodology. Kregel (1976, p. 220, n. 1) still 
retains the view that Keynes' Involuntary unemployment requires that 
"some markets . . . not clear." 
18. This is the anomaly that led Davidson and Smolensky (1964, p. 
170) to make the following odd statement in their textbook: 
This level of employment, where the quantity of labor demanded 
equals the quantity of labor supplied, is called full employment. 
At full employment, all workers who are willing to work at the going 
real wage rate can find new jobs. Since the number of people who 
will be willing to work is an increasing function of the real wage 
rate, full employment does not connote a fixed number of employed 
workers. It is possible for the economy to move from one full 
employment level to another. 
It is a strange definition of "full employment" that makes it "possible 
for the economy to move from one full employment level to another." But 
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that is precisely the type of definition that has gained widespread 
acceptance in modern economics. 
19. Therefore, Keynes' economics does not require a turn toward the 
non-market clearing economics popularized by Barro and Grossman (1976) 
and generalized by Hal Varian (1977). Nor does it necessitate a defense 
of Keynes based upon the Austrian-styled concerns over market signalling 
and communications breakdowns of the sort undertaken by Leijonhufvud 
(1968). 
20. Recent cataloguings of possible explanations for money wage 
rigidity have been advanced by Robert Solow (1979, 1980). In addition to 
Keynes' (1936, p. 14) own relative wage hypothesis (see footnote 8 
above), modern economic theory has thrown up a formidable list of reasons 
why money wages may not fall in the face of excess supply in the labor 
market. These range from the invocation of worker irrationality 
associated with the venerable "money illusion" argument, e.g., Tobin 
(1947), to the hyperrationality of the implicit contracts literature, 
e.g., Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975), and Gordon (1974). 
21. In addition, Keynes' assumption that the money wage was fixed 
throughout much of The General Theory can be viewed as a consequence of 
his treatment of labor as the numeraire commodity. If labor's nominal 
price is fixed, while all other prices are free to vary, there is no 
rigid relative price in Keynes' system. The following passage from The 
General Theory supports the view that labor was Keynes' (1936, pp. 213-
14, emphasis in original) numeraire commodity; 
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I sympathise . . . with the pre-classical doctrine that everything 
is produced by labor, aided by what used to be called art and is now 
called technique, by natural resources which are free or cost a rent 
according to their scarcity or abundance, and by the results of past 
labor, embodied in assets, which also command a price according to 
their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard labor, 
including, of course, the personal service of the entrepreneur and 
his assistant, as the sole factor of production, operating in a 
given environment of technique, natural resources, capital equipment 
and effective demand. This partly explains why we have been able to 
take the unit of labor as the sole physical unit which we require in 
our economic system apart from units of money and of time. 
Even Arthur Marget (1942, p. 597, n. 101) in his self-professed polemical 
attack on Keynes' contributions to monetary theory acknowledged that "Mr. 
Keynes has simply followed an 'old Cambridge' practice in making use of 
the 'wage-unit' as a numeraire." However, while "old Cambridge's" "wage-
unit" was the real wage rate, Keynes' "wage-unit" was the money wage 
rate. 
22. Victoria Chick (1978, p. 2) has observed that Keynes, "by 
demonstrating the possibility of underemployment equilibrium, drew 
attention to the possibility that unemployment might persist if left 
untouched by policy. The private sector in this state generates no force 
for adjustment toward full employment. 
23. Modern Marshallians like Chick (1978), Davidson (1967), and 
Kregel (1976) all share the view that Keynes' involuntary unemployment 
requires a persistent imbalance in supply and demand in at least one 
market. 
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APPENDIX 
The Walrasian two-sector "shifting equilibrium" case can be 
discerned in Hicks' (1937) SILL model. Adapting the Welntraub (1957) and 
Wells' (1978) development of Keynes' (1936) aggregate demand and supply 
price framework, we illustrate a Walrasian one-sector "shifting 
equilibrium." 
Define aggregate supply price as the volume of money proceeds that 
would just make it worthwhile for entrepreneurs to hire each possible 
level of employment, N—the minimum amount of revenue entrepreneurs must 
receive to cover their costs of production as well as earn "acceptable" 
profits at each possible level of employment. Aggregate supply price can 
be specified as follows: 
Z = wN + F + IT (A. 1) 
where w is the nominal wage rate, F is the fixed costs (independent of 
the level of employment), and ir is the acceptable quantity of profits 
associated with employment level N. The nominal wage rate and fixed 
costs are known with certainty to the entrepreneurs at the time they make 
their hiring decisions. 
Define aggregate demand price, D, as the money proceeds 
entrepreneurs anticipate will be forthcoming at each possible level of 
employment. Under laissez-faire in the one sector model aggregate demand 
price is the sum of expected consumption and investment expenditures as N 
varies. Aggregate demand price can be specified as follows: 
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D = c* [wN + F + tt] + Dg (A. 2) 
c* Is the anticipated propensity to consume. Entrepreneurs, given the 
nominal wage rate and fixed costs, are able to forecast c* accurately for 
any level of employment. 
For Keynes, D^, the expected Investment expenditure, was determined 
by the marginal efficiency of capital schedule and the rate of interest 
on money. The volatility of the former, due to its dependence on the 
state of long term expectation, led Keynes to contend that the 
relationship between and N was weak. For simplicity, will be 
treated as an "autonomous" variable here. 
Profit maximization drives entrepreneurs to hire laborers up to the 
point where aggregate supply and demand price equalize. Thus, the demand 
for labor—given w, F, and —is set at the point of effective demand, 
or at the point where Z=D: 
Total differentiation of equality A.3 under the assumptions that c* 
is less than unity and that TT IS an increasing function of N implies that 
the demand for labor is a decreasing function of the nominal wage rate, a 
decreasing function of fixed costs, and an increasing function of 
anticipated Investment expenditures: 
The demand for labor curve will be negatively sloped in money wage-
wN + F + 71 = c* [wN + F + TT ] + Dg (A. 3) 
= f(w,F,D2) f^ < 0, fg < 0, fg > 0 (A. 4) 
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employment space (see Figure 1). Fixed costs and the expected proceeds 
from investment spending are held constant. Once a nominal wage rate is 
set contractually, the demand for labor is determined precisely. For 
example, in Figure 1 at money wage rate WQ, the demand for labor will be 
0^-
But would NQ units of labor be forthcoming at nominal wage rate w^? 
For Keynes, involuntary unemployment existed if the supply of labor would 
be forthcoming to validate a rise in the demand for labor associated with 
an Increase in effective demand. Keynes's chapter two definition 
constrains the labor warranted by higher effective demand to be made 
available at a lower real wage rate. The chapter three definition, 
however, does not require the real wage rate to fall with an expansion in 
effective demand and employment. 
To determine whether the quantity of labor warranted by the increase 
in effective demand will be forthcoming requires introduction of a labor 
supply function. The characteristics of the labor supply function will 
be important in what follows. 
First, consider the model with a customary labor supply function. 
The supply of labor is an increasing function of the real wage rate, w/p, 
where p is the money price of the only type of output in the model (see 
Figure 2) 
N® = g(w/p) g' > 0 (A.5) 
Price level variations shift the labor supply curve. 
If the supply equals the demand for labor, the following equality 
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Figure 1, The demand for labor 
Figure 2. The supply of labor 
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must hold: 
fCw.F.Dg) = g(w/p) (A.6) 
Equality A.6—the labor market-clearing condition—implies the following 
reduced form equation for employment: 
The nature of the labor supply function coupled with the implicit labor 
market clearing condition underlying function A.8 means that N* cannot 
rise without an increase in the real wage. 
When there is persistent excess demand in the labor market, the 
actual level of employment is determined by the labor supply function; 
In parallel fashion, when there is persistent excess supply in the labor 
market, the actual level of employment is determined by the labor demand 
function: 
N* = G(w,w/p,F,D2) 
<0, Gg > 0, G^ <0, G^ > 0. 
(A. 7) 
N = N® when > N® (A.8) 
N when (A. 9) 
With the model based upon equations A.4 and A.5 by Keynes's first 
definition, involuntary unemployment is only possible when the labor 
market fails to clear. With labor supply function A.4, there is no 
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logical possibility of moving from a market-clearing combination of money 
wage rate, w*, real wage rate, W*/PQ, and employment level, N* (see 
Figure 3) to both a higher level of employment and a lower real wage 
rate. 
More employment at a lower real wage only can be obtained by moving 
from a condition of excess supply in the labor market, e.g., achieved by 
lowering the money wage rate while the price level is held constant 
(although Keynes's chapter 19 stress on the money wage-price level nexus 
suggests this is Impossible). 
Alternatively, assume the money wage rate is stuck at w^ and 
consider Keynes's chapter two test for involuntary unemployment. Expand 
effective demand, e.g., by introducing government spending, thus shifting 
D D' 
the labor demand curve rightward from N to N as entrepreneurs come to 
expect a higher level of money proceeds at each level of employment. 
There will be an accompanying Inflation as entrepreneurs expand 
their hiring, shifting the labor supply function leftward as the price 
level goes from to P^. The supply and demand for labor now equalize 
at real wage w^/P^ and employment level N^. Both the demand and supply 
for labor at are greater at a lower real wage than the original level 
of employment at N^ . 
Thus far, there is no difference between Keynes's definition of 
less-than-full employment and the conventional view that Involuntary 
unemployment means excess supply in the labor market. To break with the 
conventional view, include at least one other variable in the labor 
supply function besides the real wage. We introduce the real value of 
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Figure 3. Case 3 
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assets (or wealth), A/P, where A is a measure of the nominal value of 
assets held by workers. The magnitude of A depends on the size of 
workers' accumulated personal savings. Assume that the labor supply is 
inversely related to these non-labor sources of Income: 
N® = g(w/P, A/P) gj > 0 gg < 0. (A.10) 
Now, when the labor market clears, the relevant equality becomes: 
fCw.F.D^) = g(w/P, A/P) (A.11) 
and the associated reduced form equation for employment will be: 
N* = GCw.w/P.A/P.F.Dg) 
GJ <0, GG > 0, G^ <0, G^ < 0, G^ > 0. (A.12) 
Now, an inflationary expansion in effective demand achieved by 
additional government expenditure when the nominal wage is fixed will 
lower the real wage rate as well as the real value of assets held by 
workers. The situation will be aggravated if workers must deplete their 
savings to survive in the midst of high unemployment. If the real asset 
effect dominates the real wage effect, it becomes possible in the one-
sector world to move from a market-clearing level of employment, N*, to a 
higher level of employment, N, at a lower real wage (see Figure 4). 
When the real asset effect dominates the real wage effect, an 
inflation that raises the price level from P^ to P^ will shift the labor 
supply curve to the right instead of to the left. At the price level 
attained after the expansion of effective demand, P^, both the supply 
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Figure 5. Case 5 
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(Nj) and demand (N) for labor exceed the original level of employment N*. 
Although the labor market clears at real wage rate (W*/PQ), this is not 
full employment by Keynes's first definition. In fact, at employment 
level, N, the labor market does not clear but it still represents a 
higher level of employment than the initial market-clearing level! 
Another break with the conventional view of involuntary unemployment 
is to turn exclusively to Keynes's chapter three definition. This 
definition permits us to relax the constraint that the real wage rate 
must fall with an effective demand induced increase in employment. We 
can retrieve the customary labor supply function A.5 to illustrate this 
argument. We now assume further that the money wage rate can be 
recontracted until the labor market clears. 
In Figure 5, the money wage rate can rise with the increase in 
effective demand. Moreover, it can go up proportionately more than the 
associated rise in the price level, resulting in an increase in the real 
wage rate from w*/PQ to w**/P^. If the rightward shift of the labor 
demand curve is more pronounced than the leftward shift in the labor 
supply curve, employment and the real wage rate can rise simultaneously. 
This depicts in simple fashion a procyclical change in the real wage. 
Moreover, although N* is a labor market clearing level of employment, it 
is not full employment by Keynes's chapter three definition. The 
expansion of effective demand raised employment to N**. Consequently, 
the elasticity of employment with respect to aggregate demand was not 
zero at employment level N*. 
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PART III. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND KEYNES' GENERAL THEORY 
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INTRODUCTION 
. . . the driving force of the economy lies in the future, but in 
the future as visualized in the present (Hart, 1950, p. 415). 
The actually realised results of the production and sale of 
output will only be relevant to employment in so far as they cause a 
modification of subsequent expectations. Nor, on the other hand, 
are the original expectations relevant, which led the firm to 
acquire the capital equipment and the stock of intermediate products 
and half finished materials with which it finds itself at the time 
when it has to decide the next day's output. Thus, on each and 
every occasion of such a decision, the decision will be made, with 
reference indeed to this equipment and stock, but in the light of 
the current expectations of prospective costs and sale proceeds 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 46). 
There can be little doubt that for macroeconomics, this is the era 
of rational expectations. The notion forms the backbone of the New 
Classical Economics, a formidably consistent theoretical structure whose 
proponents are clearly able, and more than willing, to call all 
competitors to answer for perceived shortcomings in rigor and 
consistency. Indeed, this modern approach has not been swallowed by all 
and certainly not in the dosage prescribed by some, but the prescription 
is a popular one and must be confronted by the unconvinced. 
If Keynes' economic legacy is to find shelter in contemporary 
theoretical quarters, it must come to terms with the powerful, and 
somewhat seductive, notion of rational expectations. Keynesians will not 
succeed in eliminating the idea by ignoring it. Neither carping 
criticisms, nor criticisms simply on the grounds of realism, seem 
altogether productive. Â careful reconsideration of rational 
expectations may reveal that not much is really at stake for Keynes' 
vision. We wish to demonstrate that the theoretical vision advanced by 
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Keynes can come to terms with the notion of rational expectations without 
major concessions. 
Of course, this perspective makes the characterization of rational 
expectations crucial, but, in fact, that characterization has always been 
problematic* We are attracted to Lucas Papademas' more general 
definition of rational expectations as "model-consistent expectations" 
(Hart, 1962, p. 87)• Rational expectations is a technique for 
construction of anticipations based upon postulated structural 
determinants of the variable being forecast. 
This means that the use of rational expectations need not be 
restricted to the province of the New Classical School. Assumptions in 
addition to rational expectations are required to produce the New 
Classical School's policy neutrality result, for example, the so-called 
Lucas supply function. Incorporating rational expectations into models 
with alternative specifications need not produce the policy neutrality 
outcome.^ Models that postulate that real national income is determined 
by exogenous "real" factors will display neutrality with respect to 
variations in the quantity of money without Incorporating rational 
2 
expectations. As Kevin Hoover (1984, p. 60, emphasis in original) has 
observed: 
While the rational expectations hypothesis is a fundamental 
part of the new classical economics, it is, nevertheless, 
independent of the other tenets. A new classical economist 
necessarily believes in rational expectations. But a belief in 
rational expectations by itself is not sufficient for one to be a 
new classical. 
Many of those who are critical of, or at least possess reservations 
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about rational expectations, point to a distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. Usually, this distinction is referred to as attributable to 
Knight and Keynes, though occasionally as only "Knightian." Those who 
emphasize such a distinction seem to be more enticed and tempted by 
Knight than by Keynes. One could speculate as to why, but our attention 
here will be devoted exclusively to clarification of Keynes' views on 
uncertainty and the ways in which human beings cope with uncertainty— 
views that are not identical with Knight's.^ 
Our discussion proceeds in four sections. In the next sections, we 
discuss Keynes' critical line of demarcation between short- and long-term 
expectation. In section two of the paper, we explore the relationship 
between Keynes' treatment of uncertainty in A Treatise on Probability and 
his treatment in The General Theory. In particular, we focus on Keynes' 
distinction between rational belief and a rational or nonrational belief. 
That distinction leads to the discussion in section three where we 
examine exactly how rational expectations might fit within the framework 
of Keynes' General Theory. Finally, in the fourth section we consider 
the implications of the New Classical School's policy neutrality 
conclusion for Keynes' theory. 
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SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM EXPECTATION 
In a review essay on The General Theory appearing immediately after 
publication of Keynes' book, Hicks (1936, p» 240) gave pride of place to 
Keynes' treatment of anticipations: 
From the standpoint of pure theory, the use of the method of 
expectations is perhaps the most revolutionary thing about the 
book* • • • 
Particular prominence was given by Keynes (1936, p. 46) himself to those 
expectations that govern the decisions of men of business: 
. . . the entrepreneur (including both the producer and the investor 
in this description) has to form the best expectations he can as to 
what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is ready to 
supply them (directly or indirectly) after the elapse of what may be 
a lengthy period; and he has no choice but to be guided by these 
expectations, if he is to produce at all by processes which occupy 
time. 
Keynes (1936, p. 24, n. 3) allowed these entrepreneurial 
expectations to be treated as certainty-equivalents as an analytical 
convenience, although he did not believe that they, in fact, possess such 
characteristics; 
An entrepreneur, who has to reach a practical decision as to 
his scale of production, does not, of course, entertain a single 
undoubtlng expectation of what the sale-proceeds of a given output 
will be, but several hypothetical expectations held with varying 
degrees of probability and defInlteness. By his expectations of 
proceeds which, if it were held with certainty, would lead to the 
same behaviour as does the bundle of vague and more various 
possibilities which actually makes up his state of expectations when 
he reaches his decision. 
Keynes' notion of "certainty-equivalence" should be placed in the context 
of his overall endeavor to explicate the generality of The General 
Theory. The assumption of certainty-equivalence can be made, but It does 
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not have to be made. 
In The General Theory, business decisions involve two types of 
expectations—short-term and long-term. Keynes (1936, p. 46) even argued 
that ". . . certain individuals or firms [are] specialized in the forming 
of the first type of expectation and others in the framing of the second 
type." Hicks (1936, p. 243) Identified this pattern of specialization as 
being partitioned sectorally.^ For Hicks, wage-goods or consumption-
goods producers formulate short-term expectations, focusing on current 
receipts; the capital goods producers formulate long-term expectations. 
Even if Hicks' partition Is accepted. Hicks himself still indicated 
that the influence of each type of expectation does not operate on each 
set of entrepreneur's decisions with complete independence. The demand 
for the output of wage-goods sector "... comes partly from people 
engaged in the investment industries. . ." (Hicks, 1936, p. 243). 
Therefore, the state of long-term expectation affects the decisions of 
consumption-goods producers, although the decisions of capital-goods 
producers may be independent of the state of short-term expectation. One 
need not, however, accept Hicks' dichotomy if the specialization between 
types of forecasters occurs among individuals involved with a single 
enterprise. Managers might be more concerned with forming short-term 
expectations while owners might be more concerned with forming long-term 
expectations. 
But precisely how did Keynes distinguish between the two types of 
expectations? In his words (Keynes, 1936, p. 46), "[Short-term 
expectation] Is concerned with the price which a manufacturer can expect 
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to get for his finished output at the time when he commits himself to 
starting the process which will produce it; output being 'finished' (from 
the point of view of the manufacturer) when it is ready to be used or to 
be sold to a second party." In contrast, Keynes (1936, p. 47) described 
long-term expectation as being "... concerned with what the 
entrepreneur can hope to earn in the shape of future returns if he 
purchases (or, perhaps, manufactures) 'finished' output as an addition to 
his capital equipment." 
In Chapter 12, which is devoted to a full development of Keynes' 
views on long-term expectation, Keynes offered a still more concise 
distinction between his two categories of anticipations. He treated 
long-term expectation as governing decisions Involving expansion of plant 
and equipment while short-term expectations provide "... the basis [on] 
which a producer estimates what he will get for a product when it is 
finished if he decides to begin producing it today with the existing 
plant. . ." (Keynes, 1936, p. 148). Dissolving Hicks' partition 
altogether permits short-term expectation to determine how intensively 
existing plant is used—how great or small is excess capacity—while 
long-term expectation determines alterations in the size of the plant for 
an existing enterprise. 
Consistent with this latter distinction are Keynes' (1936, p. 47, 
emphasis in original) observations following his initial definitions of 
the two types of expectations; 
The behaviour of each individual firm in deciding Its dally output 
will be determined by its short-term expectations—expectations as 
to the cost of output on various possible scales and expectations as 
71 
to the sales-proceeds of this output; though, in the case of 
additions to capital-equipment and even of sales to distributors, 
these short-term expectations will largely depend on the long-term 
(or medium-term) expectations of other parties. 
Aside from the important suggestion that individual producers must gauge 
the expectations of other products, Keynes (1936, p. 47, n. 1, emphasis 
in original) placed stress directly on short-term expectations' influence 
on "daily output": "Daily here stands for the shortest interval after 
which the firm is free to revise its decision as to how much employment 
to offer. It is, so to speak, the minimum effective unit of time." 
Although the state of short-term expectation is crucial in Keynes' 
analytical apparatus as a direct determinant of employment, it is not the 
object of intense scrutiny In The General Theory. Keynes (1936, pp. 50-
51, emphasis added) explained his passive attitude toward the discussion 
of short-term expectation in the following passage: 
Express reference to current long-term expectations can seldom 
be avoided. But it will often be safe to omit reference to short-
term expectation, in view of the fact that in practice the process 
of revision of short-term expectation is a gradual and continuous 
one, carried on largely in the light of realised results; so that 
expected and realised results run Into and overlap one another In 
their Influence. For, although output and employment are determined 
by the producer's short-term expectations and not by past results, 
the most recent results usually play a predominant part in 
determining what these expectations are. It would be too 
complicated to work out the expectations novo whenever a 
productive process was being started; and it would, moreover, be a 
waste of time since a large part of the circumstances usually 
continue substantially unchanged from one day to the next. 
Accordingly it is sensible for producers to base their expectations 
on the assumption that the most recently realised results will 
continue, except in so far as there are definite reasons for 
expecting a change. Thus in practice there is a large overlap 
between the effects on employment of the realised sale-proceeds of 
recent output and those of the sale-proceeds expected from current 
input; and producers' forecasts are more often gradually modified in 
the light of results than in anticipation of prospective changes. 
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On the face of it, one might view Keynes' short-term expectations as 
autoregressive or adaptive—changing or adjusting based upon 
discrepancies between the expectations and the realizations. But, 
analytically, it would do no harm to treat the realizations as identical 
with the short-term expectations—as if the short-term expectations are 
perfect foresight forecasts of price and costs conditions when output is 
brought to market. Kregel (1976, p. 213) has pinpointed evidence from 
Keynes' correspondence surrounding reactions to The General Theory that 
documents Keynes' willingness to treat short-term expectations as fully 
realized. Leijonhufvud (1983, pp. 184-5) has made just such an argument 
about Keynes' handling of short-term expectations, adding with an ironic 
twist: 
Keynes' own treatment of short-term expectations should give 
pause to anyone tempted to attack the [New Classical Economics] on 
the grounds that it assumes too much foresight on the part of 
agents. . . . 
. . . this is "perfect foresight" such as the rational expectations 
people have not allowed themselves to Indulge in! Keynes, I think, 
should have appreciated the considerable weakening of this 
assumption achieved through the use of a stochastic equilibrium 
concept. 
Similarly, Hicks (p. 242) in 1936 viewed Keynes' short-term expectations 
as the tame element in Keynes' attempt to push anticipations to the 
center of economic theory. In contrast, "... long-term expectations 
. . . are wayward things." For Leijonhufvud (1983, p. 185), nearly a 
half-century later "[Ijong-term expectations are another story; they are 
'ill-behaved'." They cannot be perfect foresight forecasts. Nor can 
they be rational expectations forecasts because they cannot be explained 
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from any discernible model of the economy. Concludes Leljonhufvud (1983, 
p. 186), "... Keynes' short-term expectations were (excessively) well-
behaved but his long-term expectations Ill-behaved In that they shifted 
for reasons not Incorporated in the model." 
Long-term expectations are, of necessity, woven from whole cloth 
because they are the products of uncertain knowledge. The information 
that would be most useful or directly relevant to the formulation of 
long-term expectations is that information about which entrepreneurs are 
"very uncertain" (Keynes, 1936, p. 148). Keynes (1936, p. 48, n. 1) 
warned his readers that, "By 'very uncertain' I do not mean the same 
thing as 'very improbable'." He then referred his audience to Chapter 6 
of his Treatise on Probability entitled "The Weight of Arguments." It is 
the position of ^  Treatise that plays a subtle and organic role in 
Keynes' handling of long-term expectations and uncertainty in The General 
Theory. 
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THE NATURE OF RATIONAL BELIEF AND UNCERTAINTY 
The late Alan Coddlngton (1982, p. 480) said not to make too much of 
the fact that Keynes wrote A Treatise on Probability, which was "a 
distinguished contribution to the theory of probability." We agree, 
subject to the qualification that we should not make too little of it 
either. Coddington was especially nervous that Keynes' subversive views 
on knowledge and knowing—especially in Shacklean hands (also see Loasby, 
1976)—would lead to analytical paralysis. We will argue instead that 
there is (1) an important conceptual link between A Treatise on 
Probability and The General Theory, (2) Keynes* strong views about the 
uncompromising nature of uncertainty—its irreducibility in an objective 
fashion to risk—need not lead to analytical paralysis within his 
theoretical framework, and (3) that a place can be found for rational 
expectations within Keynes' analysis of how human beings cope with true 
uncertainty. 
The 1921 publication, A Treatise on Probability, begins with an 
epistemologlcal concern—how do we know? It advances an ordinal 
probability theory where orderings are possible between propositions as 
more or less or equlprobable, but quantifiable differences between their 
likelihood are not deemed generally feasible. In a sense, Keynes 
transferred the Indifference curve apparatus to human forecasts. Because 
of the nature of his development of an ordinal probability theory as a 
counter to the frequentist or statistical approach—the latter based, 
implicitly at least, on sampling principles—Keynes eschewed the concept 
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of an "event." He replaced It Instead with the concept more attuned to 
his own love for the art of persuasion, the "proposition." 
Keynes argued that there were two primary sources of knowledge; (1) 
direct, and (2) Indirect via argument. The latter source was the concern 
of his Treatise. Keynes (1973, p. 3) wanted to admit "doubtful 
arguments" Into the realm of discourse of the Logicians because "doubtful 
arguments" are a part of the real decisions human beings make In day-to­
day life; 
The course which the history of thought has led logic to follow 
has encouraged the view that doubtful arguments are not within its 
scope. But In the actual exercise of reason we do not wait on 
certainty, or deem it irrational to depend on a doubtful argument. 
If logic Investigates the general principles of valid thought, the 
study of arguments, to which it Is rational to attach some weight, 
is as much a part of it as the study of those which are 
demonstrative. 
Keynes then considered propositions which individuals might 
entertain. These propositions fell into one of two categories. Either 
they were certain, or they were probable. Whether the proposition fell 
into one category or the other was conditioned purely by the state of 
knowledge; moreover, there were degrees of "probableness." 
In assessing a proposition, Keynes contended there was a subjective 
and an objective component. The subjective component Involved the 
selection of the "premises of our argument," but the objective component 
Involved "the purely logical relations between the propositions which 
embody our direct knowledge and the propositions about which we seek 
Indirect knowledge" (Keynes, 1973, p. 4). Keynes, at this juncture, 
seemed to treat the rules of logic themselves as fixed and Invariant—not 
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a matter of controversy or choice. Therefore, once the judgment was made 
about which premises were relevant to the construction of an argument 
about a proposition about which one lacks direct knowledge, the 
conclusion followed by a correct application of these principles of sound 
reasoning. It was at this juncture that Ramsey (see Keynes, 1963, pp. 
243-44; and Braithwalte, 1975, p. 241) interjected his now famous 
complaint that the relationship between propositions itself was not a 
matter of "formal logic" but of "human logic" instead—a point which 
Keynes subsequently conceded. But In a sense, the concession merely 
strengthened Keynes' position because It brought the subjective component 
Into both ends of the acquisition of indirect knowledge via argument. 
The selection of propositions gave the individual a set of premises 
from which to work. Application of some set of rules of logic would lead 
to the derivation of a conclusion. The premises were what the Individual 
treated as his or her knowledge. Given a particular set of logical 
rules—whether "formal" or "human"—Keynes could suggest that the 
particular state of knowledge justified a "rational belief" of degree ct 
in the conclusion. The conclusion for Keynes took the form of a 
proposition. The value that a could take could lie between zero and one, 
but it need not take on continuous values between zero and one—not in 
Keynes' ordinal context. Moreover, the estimate of a itself need not be 
held with complete confidence. It would depend upon the "weight" 
assigned to the argument which produced the conclusion—which was 
contingent on the knowledge embodied in the premises. 
"Rational belief" meant for Keynes the possession of probabilistic 
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knowledge obtained indirectly through argument. Rationality of belief, 
of course, was not equivalent to truth. Arationality or nonrationality 
of belief was not equivalent to falsehood either. Arational or 
nonrational belief could be certain or merely probable while the same was 
true of rational belief. The difference between the two major types of 
belief was the process by which they were attained. Rational belief must 
have been grounded in knowledge, however partial. The complete absence 
of knowledge meant no basis for rational belief (Keynes, 1973, p. 11). 
Rational belief was the subject matter of A Treatise on Probability. 
It is at this stage that it is fruitful to turn to Chapter 6 of _A 
Treatise—the chapter that Keynes refers to in The General Theory. 
Keynes pointed out in this chapter of A Treatise that as the relevant 
evidence at the disposal of an individual increases, the magnitude of the 
probability of an argument in support of a particular proposition may 
rise or fall. But something else must go up—the confidence the 
individual feels in the estimate of the probability of the argument. 
Keynes (1973, p. 59) wrote that the weight of the argument must have gone 
up. 
Keynes (1973, p. 59) indicated that the measurement of the weight of 
an argument was problematic, just as measurement of probability vas 
problematic. Only in a very restricted class of cases could one compare 
the weights of two different arguments. 
Keynes also (1973, p. 59) endeavored to give precision to the notion 
of relevant and irrelevant evidence, his definition reinforcing the 
subjectivist nature of rational belief. Irrelevant evidence left the 
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weight unchanged—if all parts of the evidence were considered—to avoid 
the problem of the offsetting effects of partially favorable and 
unfavorable evidence which led to no net change In the weight. 
Weight and probability thus became separate properties of an 
argument. Weight captured the confidence held by an individual in an 
argument. Probability captured the estimated likelihood of a proposition 
generated by an argument. 
In an attempt to summarize briefly: Whether beliefs were rational 
or nonrational depended upon the manner in which they were formed. 
Nonrational beliefs were those conclusions reached without direct or 
indirect knowledge. They could be held with certainty or only as more or 
less probable. Rational beliefs were those conclusions reached based 
upon knowledge via argument. Arguments possessed weights based upon 
evidence. 
Therefore, when Keynes referred to entrepreneurs being "very 
uncertain" about the evidence that is relevant to the formulation of 
long-term expectation, he meant that the pertinent facts are few and far 
between. If they endeavor to form rational beliefs in the sense of ^  
Treatise, they must assign a low weight to their arguments. They cannot 
place much confidence in their forecasts. 
In making decisions about investment, the businessmen may have 
little or no relevant evidence upon which to base their forecasts of the 
lifetime returns of a capital-asset. Keeping in mind Keynes' (1936, p. 
149) unique perspective on probability, consider the observation in The 
General Theory; 
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The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basts 
of knowledge upon which our estimates of prospective yield have to 
be made. Our knowledge of the factors which govern the yield of an 
investment some years hence is usually very slight and often 
negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of 
knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a 
copper mine, a textile factory, the good will of a patent medicine, 
an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to 
little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence. . . . 
Compare the preceding with Keynes' (1937, pp. 213-4) subsequent 
distillation of the argument of The General Theory a year after the 
book's publication: 
By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely 
to distinguish from what is known for certain and what is only 
probable. The game of roulette is not subject. In this sense, to 
uncertainty, nor is the prospect of a victory bond being drawn. Or, 
again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the 
weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using 
the term is that in which the prospect of a European war Is 
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of Interest twenty 
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new Invention, or the position 
of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these 
matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. 
Calculation of prospective yield is, in this sense, impossible. 
Rational belief based upon arguments with extremely low weights tips over 
Into the region of nonrational beliefs. In fact, Keynes (1936, p. 150) 
even alluded to the aratlonality of those who undertake enterprise: 
Business men play a mixed game of skill and chance, the average 
results of which to the players are not known by those who take a 
hand. If human nature felt no satisfaction (profit apart) in 
constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a firm, there might not 
be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation. 
And furthermore, Keynes (1936) added in two colorful passages; 
. . . individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable 
calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so that 
the thought of ultimate loss which often overtakes pioneers, as 
experience undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy 
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man puts aside the expectation of death (p. 162). 
. . . human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or 
political, or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical 
expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not 
exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the 
wheels go round, our ratio-real selves choosing between the 
alternative as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often 
falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance (pp. 162-
3). 
After all, with respect to long-term expectations there Is virtually no 
basis for calculation of profit or loss. Such calculations are "pretty, 
polite techniques, made for a well-panelled Board Room. . ." (Keynes, 
1937, p. 215). 
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RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AS A SPECIAL CASE OF KEYNES' EXPECTATIONS 
Keynes (1936, p. 155) did not view participants in an 
entrepreneurial (or a money) economy as paralyzed by "the dark forces of 
time and ignorance which envelope our future." Individuals compelled to 
construct long-term expectations find that a convention will do when 
facts are non-existent (Keynes, 1936, p. 152). Specifically, in The 
General Theory Keynes (1936, p. 152) indicated that these conventions 
include a tendency to assume that tomorrow will be like today and to 
place special faith in the correctness of existing market valuations. In 
the 1937 essay, Keynes (p. 214) adds greater emphasis to the further 
possibility of reliance upon the judgment of others who presumably 
possess superior information. Perhaps a particular group of economics is 
viewed by the businessmen as possessing greater expertise. The key is, 
in Keynes' view, whether or not the convention of the moment can be 
relied upon to remain intact. 
Keep in mind that Keynes' (1936, p. 51) entrepreneurs who make 
durable goods must form their "short-term expectations . . . based on the 
current long-term expectations of the inventory; and it is of the nature 
of long-term expectations that they cannot be checked at short intervals 
in the light of realised results." However, if the conventional basis 
for the formation of long-term expectations is maintained, then the 
durable goods producers can make their short-term forecasts with great 
confidence and accuracy. 
Calculation of prospective yield is very hard—too hard— 
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excruciatingly hard. Those who seek to do so are eccentrics and 
oddballs—. . often so much In the minority that their behaviour does 
not govern the market" (Keynes, 1936, p. 150). The normal or reasonable 
response Is to adopt the conventional basis for valuation. There Is no 
alternative that Is, typically, more workable, and adoption of the 
conventional basis lends a certain stability to economic affairs as long 
as the convention is upheld. 
However, this conventional basis for establishing long-term 
expectations is not liable to be maintained Indefinitely. In fact, 
Keynes identified five major weak points that lead to its recurrent 
breakdown: 
(1) There is a separation of ownership and management under the 
modern regime of joint stock companies that leads to a loss of 
real knowledge about the performance of specific enterprises. 
(2) Undue weight is given to day-to-day fluctuations in the profits 
of businesses "which are obviously of an ephemeral and 
nonsignificant character. . ." (Keynes, 1936, p. 154). 
(3) Mass psychology is liable to sudden changes of opinion due to 
factors not intimately related or not even pertinent to 
prospective yield. 
(4) Expert professionals do not attempt to calculate prospective 
yield, nor do they abide by the conventional valuation. 
Instead, they engage in speculation—"forecasting of the 
psychology of the market" (Keynes, 1936, p. 158)—by attempting 
to anticipate "changes in the conventional basis of valuation a 
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short time ahead of the general public" (Keynes, 1936, p. 154). 
(5) Finally, the state of confidence of the lending institutions, 
crucial to the financing of investments, may move somewhat 
independently from the state of confidence of the "speculator 
or speculative investor" (Keynes, 1936, p. 158). 
The state of long-term expectation at a particular moment is 
determined by the conventions that prevail at that moment. This means 
that Kregel's strategy of treating long-term expectation as given in a 
comparative statics context is eminently legitimate—given by the 
convention, that is. In a dynamic analysis of Keynes' system—or in 
Kregel's language In a framework of "shifting equilibrium"—one need be 
concerned about changes in the convention and how such changes dictate 
changes in the state of long-term expectation. There is no need for the 
analytical paralysis that Coddington feared, once the Importance of 
conventions is acknowledged in Keynes' theory. 
Keynes was not particularly proprietary about the convention used. 
It did not matter to him if entrepreneurs behaved as though their 
forecasts were certainty-equivalents when, in fact, they could not be. 
After all, that might be the convention of the moment. Albert Hart 
(1942, 1950), a fairly sympathetic critic of Keynes, especially was 
exercised by Keynes' willingness to permit entrepreneurs such foibles as 
"compounding probabilities" despite the accompanying loss of information 
and "flexibility" (see also Jones and Ostroy, 1984). But when belief is 
essentially nonrational in character, Keynes largely was Indifferent to 
which "pretty polite technique" the entrepreneur used to justify their 
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decisions in the "well-panelled Board Room" (or perhaps at the 
stockholder's meeting). 
An exception for Keynes was a condition where the conventional basis 
for valuation becomes dominated by the activities of the speculator. 
Then, Keynes' (1936, p. 156) marvelously apt "beauty contest" problem 
covers the terrain of capital formation. For If the convention becomes 
anticipating the revisions in conventions, if most are concerned with 
gauging what "aver ge opinion expects the average opinion to be," then, 
"[w]e have reached the third degree. . ." (Keynes, 1936, p. 156), and 
Keynes suspected that "... there are some . . . who practise the 
fourth, fifth and higher degrees."^ It is at this stage that Keynes 
(1936, p. 159) warned of the vagaries of a stock exchange under the sway 
of speculators: 
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of 
enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a 
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development 
of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the 
job is likely to be ill-done. 
The adoption of a convention typically makes coping with uncertainty 
tractable. The danger, of course, is that the convention is a mere 
convention. The source of stability becomes a source of instability when 
it changes, as it is likely to do. This is particularly true in the case 
of a major change in the monetary or fiscal regime—a point we discuss in 
greater depth below. 
Tobin (1980, p. 27) has claimed: 
An important and intractable uncertainty is the unpredictability of 
the future expectations of other agents. About these expectations 
it seems virtually impossible to form rational expectations. 
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Quite the contrary, to the extent that the convention is not 
dominated by psychology, these are the expectations that are easiest to 
calculate in a Keynes world. It is the actual prospective yield of an 
investment that lies beyond the pale of rational belief or rational 
expectations. Prospective yield has few systematic determinants that are 
detectable to those who make business decisions. 
Suppose the businessmen believe that participants on securities 
markets possess better evidence than they themselves possess. They may 
take the value of existing enterprises to be given by whatever the stock 
exchange says they are worth. They could compare that price with the 
current supply price (or replacement cost) of the enterprise to decide 
whether or not to engage in additional Investment (see Keynes, 1936, p. 
151). Thus, Tobin's (1980) q is also a potential convention that could 
be adopted by Keynes' entrepreneurs. It is a particularly intriguing 
convention, since the speculators may determine the stock market's 
valuation. Therefore, no part of the process of investment need be 
grounded in calculation of the real prospective yield. 
Or the businessmen might behave as though they can model the 
determinants of prospective yield, or they might adopt the model offered 
to them by an economist or a group of economists. They—or the 
economists—could check to make sure that the model did not generate 
prior forecasts that have serially correlated errors. If businessmen 
make their forecasts on the basis of such an approach, they would be 
pursuing a rational expectations modelling strategy for construction of 
their long-term expectations. They also would be forming nonrational 
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beliefs because the exercise would not be rooted In relevant knowledge, 
of which they cannot have much if any. 
Would Keynes be disturbed? Of course not, for this simply would 
mean the entrepreneurs had adopted that particular convention for that 
moment. Tobin's q or rational expectations would merely be the fashion 
for a certain set of entrepreneurs at a certain time. Tobin's q or 
rational expectations could provide a justification for some 
entrepreneurs' nonrational beliefs. Furthermore, depending upon how each 
entrepreneur treated the formation of other producers' expectations, 
speculation need not become the principle underlying the investment 
decision. 
In a world where there are many conventions or where a particular 
convention can justify more than one expectation, heterogeneity of 
beliefs will prevail. Such heterogeneity is essential for exchange to 
D 
take place. The configuration of prevailing conventions is an important 
element of Keynes' story since it influences the variability in beliefs 
across individuals. 
If rational expectation is merely one way to form long-term 
expectations, then it is merely one of many conventions—all of dubious 
longevity and persistence in a Keynes world. Thus, the incorporation of 
rational expectations into The General Theory yields a special case—a 
special case dictated by the particular rule of thumb of the moment used 
by entrepreneurs to calculate their long-term expectations. The General 
Theory is, as Keynes Intended, quite "general." It can accommodate any 
process of expectations formation one cares to entertain as a convention. 
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To the extent that rational expectations Is the convention of the moment, 
It may be the game of Snap—but one could just as well play Old Maid or 
Musical Chairs. 
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POLICY NEUTRALITY AND EFFECTIVE DEMAND 
As we suggested above, the rational expectations hypothesis as an 
approach to modelling the formation of expectations need not lead to the 
macroeconomlc policy neutrality conclusions associated with the New 
Classical School. Rational expectations can be Imbedded within any model 
an individual chooses as a machine for producing his or her expectations. 
The use of a model with a Lucas supply function—a practice endorsed more 
by others than by Lucas himself (see note 1 above)—will generate the now 
notorious policy neutrality results associated with the work of Sargent 
and Wallace. 
But in similar fashion, one can hold to the policy neutrality 
conclusion without having gone through a complex algebraic proof in the 
context of a Sargent and Wallace model with rational expectations. One 
might simply be convinced by their case. It may then become the 
convention for many entrepreneurs to believe that governmental 
stabilization policy will accomplish nothing. In the context of the 
Keynes model, if that is the prevailing belief, then. Indeed, government 
demand management efforts will be sterile and de facto the economy will 
be at full employment in Keynes' sense. 
In an earlier paper (Darlty and Horn, 1983), we demonstrated that 
Keynes' definition of full employment involved the absence of involuntary 
unemployment. Involuntary unemployment was said to exist if no more 
employment was forthcoming with respect to an Increase in aggregate 
effective demand. Full employment is the level of employment where the 
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elasticity of employment with respect to a change in aggregate effective 
demand is zero. 
It is convenient to display our analysis under the condition where 
there has been a widespread adoption of the beliefs of the New Classical 
School utilizing Keynes' core analytical device—the aggregate demand 
9 price and supply price framework of Chapter 3 of The General Theory. 
Keynes (1936, p. 24) defined ". . . the aggregate supply price of the 
output of a given amount of employment [as] the expectation of proceeds 
which will just make it worth the while of the entrepreneurs to give that 
employment." Aggregate supply price, therefore, is the nominal stream of 
revenues that would cover costs and provide a minimum acceptable level of 
profits at each level of employment. This minimum acceptable level of 
profit might be thought of as associated with Veblen's (p. 88) "ordinary 
rate of profit." Aggregate demand price, in contrast, is the amount of 
proceeds the entrepreneurs actually expect to receive from the output of 
each level of employment (Keynes, 1936, pp. 24-5). Following Keynes 
(1936, pp. 24-5), label the schedule that relates aggregate supply price 
to the employment of N men a Z schedule, and the schedule that relates 
aggregate demand price to the employment of N men a D schedule. Note 
that both schedules are psychological magnitudes—in the minds of 
entrepreneurs. 
Where the schedules Intersect, the entrepreneurs in the aggregate 
are maximizing prospective profits. The point of intersection is the 
point of effective demand which determines the equilibrium level of 
employment—the level they wish to offer to workers (see Figure 1). 
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Whether or not it is a full employment level depends upon whether or not 
an expansion in aggregate demand causes the D and Z schedules to shift in 
a fashion that moves the point of effective demand rightward. 
If, as in Keynes' day, the "Treasury View" was abroad and if it had 
substantial adherents in the business community, conventional belief 
would have it that additional government spending would be entirely 
offset by a decline in private expenditure. Crowding out would be 
expected to be complete. A credible announcement of the government's 
spending plans would have no effect on the position of the aggregate 
demand price or D schedule in the minds of the entrepreneurs. They would 
anticipate no change in the proceeds forthcoming at each level of 
employment. To the extent that there was no effect on their perceptions 
of the conditions influencing the aggregate supply price schedule, the 
point of effective demand and employment would remain the same. Short-
term expectations may be frustrated, but businessmen would have no reason 
to change investment strategies. However, no test was genuinely 
conducted for the existence of Keynes' involuntary unemployment because 
aggregate effective demand did not change. It does not change because of 
the entrepreneurs' adoption of a convention—the Treasury View—that 
leads them to believe it cannot change. 
What about the situation when the entrepreneurs adopt the policy 
neutrality conclusions of the New Classical School? Here, the aggregate 
demand price schedule actually could shift upward due to the injection of 
additional expenditure by the government or expansionary monetary policy. 
But if entrepreneurs believe in the policy neutrality conclusion, they 
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also will expect their costs to rise in such a way that aggregate supply 
price schedule will shift upward as well to preserve the same point of 
the effective demand (see the intersection of the D' and Z' schedules in 
Figure 1). In nominal terms, aggregate effective demand went up, but 
there were no real effects. In this Instance, by Keynes' definition the 
economy was at full employment because an increase in aggregate effective 
demand could not increase the employment level. 
Both cases are observationally equivalent in terms of the real 
performance of the economy. The employment level remains at N*. But 
they are theoretically different, for the Treasury View leaves the 
unobservable aggregate demand and supply price schedules in the same 
position while the New Classical Economics mandates that they both shift 
upward to preserve the same point of effective demand. 
For these policies to become effective in raising employment, the 
conventional basis for forming expectations must give way—perhaps 
altered by persuasive argument. A new convention needs to beheld by a 
sufficient number of entrepreneurs that leads them to believe that such 
policies will improve their profit position. Suppose the unemployed do 
increase their consumption expenditures if they receive the money to do 
so via government transfers. Entrepreneurs still must believe that the 
observed rise in consumption will have a sustained positive effect on 
profitability to alter their employment decision.The entrepreneurs' 
confidence in the effectiveness of a policy determines the effectiveness 
of a policy. 
Now the task of The General Theory also can be seen in a clearer 
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light. The General Theory was intended, according to Keynes' (1936, pp. 
v-vl) own statement in the preface to the volume, as an exercise in 
persuasion targeted at his fellow economists. Wrote Keynes (1936, p. 
vi), "At this stage of the argument the general public, though welcome at 
the debate, are only eavesdroppers. . . ." Keynes had to persuade the 
economists either because they had the ears of the businessmen and were 
propounding the Treasury View, or because they had lost the ears of the 
businessmen who had withdrawn from investment altogether in the absence 
of any convention to rely upon. The General Theory can be viewed as an 
attempt to propagate an alternative vision among economists that would 
inaugurate a new convention among producers—a convention that would 
respond favorably to fiscal and monetary stimuli. 
From the standpoint of Keynes' alternative vision, full employment 
and the "true" inflation barrier can be viewed as having a purely 
expectational foundation rather than a technological or natural resource 
endowment foundation. Full employment as a maximum maximorum is not a 
stable position as long as the convention governing the state of long-
term expectation is not stable. Beliefs in the Treasury View or the 
conclusions of New Classical Economics could give way to a new convention 
that is either pessimistic or optimistic about the effects of a policy 
intervention in the entrepreneur's eyes. In times of major regime 
changes, conventions are liable to be in flux, and enterprise is likely 
to dwindle (Keynes, 1936, p. 162); 
. . . not only [are] slumps and depressions . . . exaggerated in 
degree, but economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a 
political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average 
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business man. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New Deal 
depresses enterprise, this need not be the result either of 
reasonable calculation or of a plot with political intent; —it Is 
the mere consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of 
spontaneous optimism. In estimating the prospects of investment, we 
must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the 
digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose 
spontaneous activity it largely depends. 
The deeper message is this: Successful policy intervention is an 
economic environment that preserves an Important role for private 
enterprise is a constant struggle for the hearts and minds of the 
businessmen. This seems to be one lesson the current President of the 
United States appears to understand. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Lucas (1981, p. 5, emphasis In original) himself has 
acknowledged that If the labor supply function was modified to include 
interest rates, the Lucas supply function and the neutrality of money no 
longer would apply: 
In any formulation intertemporal substitution Involves current 
hours supplied responding to something with the dimensions of a real 
interest rate or real rate of return. An expected price inflation 
affects behavior in our model because it lowers the real return on 
labor supplied today for purposes of consuming tomorrow. If today's 
labor is transformed into tomorrow's consumption via the holding of 
interest-bearing bonds and if the expected inflation induces a one-
for-one increase in the nominal interest rate on these bonds, then 
the real rate of return relevant for the current-hour's decision 
will not be affected by inflationary expectations in any way. 
Rapping and I simply evaded this difficulty by acknowledging it as a 
possibility but noting that interest rates do not seem to adjust in 
this way, for reasons we did not explore. This was the right 
decision, I think, since there was no hope of resolving this 
difficulty at the partial-equilibrium level at which we were 
working. Yet the question keeps coming up in other context and is 
still largely unresolved. Indeed, when any macroeconomist employs a 
Lucas (really, of course, Lucas-Rapping) supply function, he too is 
evading this issue (as well as the responsibility for doing so!). 
2. See, for example, Milton Friedman's (1974) well-known 
clarification on the theoretical framework underlying his monetary 
theory. 
3. Meltzer's (1982, pp. 5-8) recent explication on risk and 
uncertainty is representative of this tendency. 
4. Knight (1971, pp. 338-9) suggested that organizational 
innovations can cope with fundamental uncertainty—large-scale 
operations, use of insurance, and scientific research—a position Keynes 
never would have accepted. 
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5. Meltzer (1982, pp. 8-14) advances the possibility that an 
objective probability distribution exists but its parameters keep 
changing. For instance, the mean of the distribution could be 
nonstationary. If it keeps changing in ways that cannot be foreseen, it 
would be impossible to form certainty-equivalent expectations. Agents 
still may pretend that they have formed certainty-equivalent 
expectations. 
6. The two sector approach to the General Theory is valuable. 
Part of the failure of the two sector approach to gain widespread 
adoption may have been an adverse reaction to Hicks' (1936) peculiar 
justification based on short- versus long-term expectations. The two-
sector approach is useful for various other reasons, including the 
dependence of total employment on differences in each sector's employment 
elasticity. See MacKay and Waud (1975), Floyd and Hynes (1978), and 
Chakrabarti (1979). 
7. For a recent formalization of the difficulties the "beauty 
contest" problem poses in the context of a world where all market 
participants seek to form rational expectations, see Roman Frydman 
(1982). 
8. With respect to his doctrine of liquidity-preference, Keynes 
(1936, p. 198) observed: 
If the change in the news affects the judgment and the 
requirements of everyone in precisely the same way, the rate of 
interest (as indicated by the prices of bonds and debts) will be 
adjusted forthwith to the new situation without any market 
transactions being necessary. 
Thus, in the simplest case, where everyone is similar and 
96 
similarly placed, a change in circumstances or expectations will not 
be capable of causing any displacement of money whatever; —it will 
simply change the rate of interest in whatever degree is necessary 
to offset the desire of each individual, felt at the previous rate, 
to change his holding of cash in response to the new circumstances, 
or expectations; and, since everyone will change his ideas as to the 
rate which would induce him to alter his holdings of cash In the 
same degree, no transaction will result. 
Tobin (1958, pp. 66-70) coupled Keynes' emphasis on differences in 
opinion being a prerequisite for market transactions to come about with a 
claim that Keynes attributed complete confidence to each investor in his 
or her variously held expectations. This led Tobin to argue that Keynes' 
liquidity preference theory resulted in the empirically inaccurate 
implication that individuals would hold portfolios that were specialized 
completely. How Tobin arrived at the view that Keynes attributed no 
doubts about their forecasts of interest rates to investors is not clear. 
To the extent that their portfolio decisions require formation of long-
term expectations, their confidence is Inherently fragile. It Is 
dependent in part to the stability and mix of prevailing conventions. To 
the extent that their portfolio decisions are matters of short-term 
expectations, confidence is contingent on the (subjective) weight they 
are willing to assign to the argument that Is the basis for their 
beliefs. That weight need not be the maximum feasible. Therefore, their 
portfolios are liable to be diversified rather than specialized under the 
terms of Keynes' theory. 
9. Here, we follow James Millar's (1972) relatively literal 
interpretation of Keynes' aggregate demand and supply price apparatus. 
10. For example, suppose entrepreneurs possess rational 
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expectations and make a pessimistic forecast about the consequences of 
expansionary government fiscal policy. Suppose further that the level of 
consumption expenditures proves to be considerably higher than their 
forecasts. Then, they will have to decide whether the departure is due 
to purely stochastic variation or due to their possession of an incorrect 
model. If they take the former position, they will continue to maintain 
the same, less than full employment, scale of production. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Hllferding/Laughlln story hinted at In the first essay has yet 
to be written. The Implications of the second essay are far from clear, 
and the paper Is essentially silent on many of the fundamental Issues. 
Then, there Is the matter of Veblen. Regarding the third essay, as It 
stands It tries to do too many things and perhaps attributes a greater 
Impact to rational expectations than is justified. 
The only conclusion to be drawn Is that there is much to be done. 
